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Abstract
Numerous authors point to a decline in joint liability microcredit, and rise in
individual liability lending. But empirical evidence is lacking, and there have
been no rigorous analyses of possible causes. We first show using the well-
known MIX Market dataset that there is evidence for a decline. Second, we show
theoretically that commercialization–an increase in competition and a shift from
non-profit to for-profit lending (both of which are present in the data)–drives
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model’s key predictions, and find support for them in the data.
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1. Introduction
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), and in particular Muhammad Yunus’ Grameen
Bank, have long attracted the interest of economists for their success in lending
to poor borrowers written off as uncreditworthy by traditional lenders. A large
literature analyzes the innovative contractual tools used by MFIs to achieve
this, of which the best known is joint liability lending (JL), whereby the bor-
rower and one or more group members assume liability for one another’s debts.
Joint liability has been shown to be able to overcome problems of adverse se-
lection, moral hazard and limited enforcement, leveraging social collateral that
can substitute for the conventional collateral that the poor, by definition, lack.1
In the recent literature it has become common to see claims of a wide-spread
decline in the use of JL.2 Yet such claims are anecdotal, typically pointing
to high-profile examples such as Grameen, BancoSol, and ASA who initially
pioneered the use of joint liability credit yet have since moved to an individual
liability (IL) lending model. Moreover, we are aware of no satisfactory account
of what has changed about the lending environment to reverse the initial success
of JL.
We make two contributions. First, we show empirically that there has indeed
been a trend away from JL in recent years. To do this we use an MFI-level panel
from the well-known data collected by the MIX Market, covering the years 2008–
2014. This data source is unique in containing the crucial lending methodology
information needed for our analysis.
Second, we argue theoretically and empirically that the trend can be ex-
plained, at least in part, by commercialization. By commercialization, we refer
to two forces: increases in for-profit lending, and increased competition. First,
as we document, the microcredit industry has shifted from being largely made
up of non-profit and NGO lenders to an increasingly for-profit marketplace. In
1For a detailed review of both the theory and history of JL, see Ghatak and Guinnane
(1999) and Armenda´riz de Aghion and Morduch (2010).
2E.g. Hermes and Lensink (2007), Armenda´riz de Aghion and Morduch (2010), Gine´ et al.
(2011), Breza (2013), Feigenberg et al. (2013), Carpena et al. (2013), Gine´ and Karlan (2014).
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our model, non-profits and for-profits target different objective functions, and
thus behave differently in equilibrium. Second, competition among lenders for
borrowers has increased, leading to an expansion of the sector. In our model,
competition improves borrowers’ outside options in case of default, by making
it easier to find another lender.3
We present a simple model that makes three empirical predictions. First,
for-profit lenders are less likely to use JL than non-profits. Second, competition
induces non-profits to switch from JL to IL. Third, in contrast to the broad
trend, competition induces for-profits to switch from IL to JL. While the three
effects are not all in the same direction, the net effect is such that beginning
from an uncompetitive, largely non-profit market, increasing competition and
increasing the for-profit share in the market both lead to increases in the use of
IL.
Intuitively, the main driving force in our model is that JL involves tighter
incentive constraints than IL, since in some states of the world, it involves not
only repaying one’s own loan, but also helping a group member repay her loan.
At the same time, the advantage of JL is, because any given loan gets repaid
with greater probability, the borrower gets to maintain access to credit from the
lender, and depending on the market structure, the interest rate could go down.
Non-profits choose whatever lending arrangement has higher borrower welfare,
subject to the incentive constraints and a break-even constraint. The theory
implies that JL maximizes borrower welfare, so non-profits offer JL whenever
they can break even while doing so. Competition tends to reduce their use
of JL as it improves the borrower’s outside option, namely the possibility of
obtaining a new loan if she defaults at her current lender. This reduces the
cost of losing her existing contract and thus tightening the more demanding
incentive constraint, namely, that under JL. The for-profit also requires JL to
break even, but additionally it must be more profitable than IL. Since this is a
3We also show in an extension that our qualitative predictions hold under alternative
notions of competition.
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stricter condition, the for-profit ends up offering JL to fewer borrowers. Finally,
as competition increases, for-profits tend to use JL more (unlike non-profits) as
revenue under JL is less sensitive to the borrower’s outside option than under
IL. We show that the qualitative conclusions of the theory are robust to other
effects of competition, such as imposing constraints on lenders’ ability to charge
high interest rates at the loan offer stage.
We then test the implications of the model empirically, exploiting within-
region, within-country and within-MFI variation in lenders’ for-profit status and
lending methodology. We lack direct measures of the level of competition in the
microcredit market, so instead we use proxy measures that try to capture ac-
cess to and depth of financial markets in the country in general, rather than
microcredit in particular. Our identifying assumption is that these measures
are valid proxies for borrowers’ outside options in the microcredit sector, either
because the formal sector competes with the microcredit sector or because the
proxies reflect underlying developments that make it easier for borrowers to ac-
cess alternative forms of finance. We find that for-profit lenders indeed tend to
use JL less than non-profits. We find strong support for the prediction that JL
usage by for-profits is increasing in our competition proxy. Although the data
are more supportive of no response than the predicted overall negative effect, we
do find robustly that non-profits do not increase JL usage when competition in-
creases, i.e. they respond qualitatively differently to for-profits in the predicted
direction.
With the data available we cannot perfectly resolve the issue of identification,
but we perform a number of robustness checks. Our findings are robust to two
panel definitions (strongly balanced and weakly balanced), to the inclusion of
a broad range of controls, interactions and fixed effects. They also hold up
when we replace our long panel with a shorter one containing more MFIs and
countries, which also contains alternative measures of IL and JL usage intensity.4
4Our main dataset uses data provided to us by Chris Ahlin, who uses it in Ahlin and Suandi
(2018), a paper we discuss below. These data are preferred because of their long coverage,
from 2008–2014, but they only contain measures of IL usage by number of loans, not by value.
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We take further comfort from the fact that the model’s prediction for for-profits’
response to changes in competition–which is strongly supported in the data–is
in the opposite direction to overall trends and therefore we think provides a
strong test of the theory.
Our theory fits into a branch of the literature that highlights the leverage of
social capital, especially through JL lending, as a key feature of microcredit.5
Our model explains changes in the use of JL via changes in the level of social
capital required for an MFI to be willing to offer JL. Since we cannot observe so-
cial capital, our main identifying assumption is that changes in the unobservable
social environment are uncorrelated with changes in the market structure and
competitive environment, conditional on our various controls and fixed effects.
At least in the short run, we believe that this is a plausible assumption.
We are not in fact the first to note an association between commercialization
and the decline of JL. Karlan and Zinman (2009a) write:6
[T]he industrial organization of microcredit is trending toward some-
thing that looks more like the cash loan market: for-profit, more
competitive delivery of untargeted, individual liability loans... This
evolution is happening from both the bottom-up (non-profits con-
verting to for-profits) and the top-down (for-profits expanding into
subprime and consumer segments).
However to our knowledge we are the first to outline the theoretical and
empirical case for a causal relationship from the former to the latter.
In related work, Cull et al. (2009) use an early version of the MIX Market
data to provide a descriptive overview of the microcredit industry. Notably,
they observe that non-profits are more likely than for-profits to use JL lending
Our alternative dataset is a shorter panel, also from the MIX, covering 2008–2011, and is the
dataset used in prior circulated versions of this paper. It is valuable for robustness checking
because it contains more MFIs as well as data on IL lending by value.
5E.g. Besley and Coate (1995), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), Karlan (2005), Karlan
(2007), Ahlin and Townsend (2007), Cassar and Wydick (2010), de Quidt et al. (2016),
de Quidt et al. (in press).
6See also Karlan and Zinman (2009b).
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methods, as our model predicts and as we also observe in our chronologically
later and larger sample. McIntosh et al. (2005) show empirically that increasing
competition between lenders in Uganda harmed repayment performance, in line
with the mechanism proposed in our paper (they put more weight on a multiple
borrowing interpretation than weakened repayment incentives, though the latter
naturally goes hand in hand with the former; our model features only the second
channel). Baquero et al. (forthcoming), use proprietary rating agency data on
microfinance institutions to study the effect of market concentration on interest
rates in sector, finding that non-profits are insensitive to concentration while for-
profits charge lower interest rates in less concentrated markets. This is consistent
with our conceptualization of the differing motivations for for-profit lenders (who
charge the highest incentive compatible rate) and non-profit lenders (who charge
break-even interest rates). McIntosh and Wydick (2005) study theoretically
the effects of competition on lenders’ ability to cross-subsidize between clients
who vary in their wealth. Baland et al. (2013) also study the choice between
JL and IL contracts, focusing on the relationship with borrower wealth and
arguing that wealthier borrowers are better served by JL. Our conceptualization
of competition closely relates to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Hoff and Stiglitz
(1997).
We do not claim great theoretical novelty for the basic workhorse model in
this paper, which we have used in earlier work and which takes its lead from
Besley and Coate (1995). The focus of this paper is two positive questions.
First, is the anecdotal trend away from joint liability observable in the data?
Second, how does it relate to commercialization of the sector? In two prior
papers we have used variants of the same model to study different questions. In
de Quidt et al. (2016) we abstract completely from market structure, studying
an environment with a single non-profit lender, and analyze theoretically when
individual liability can mimic features of joint liability.7 In de Quidt et al. (in
7Allen (2016) works with a very similar model, studying structurally the optimal extent of
“partial” joint liability.
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press) we focus on a normative question: what are the welfare consequences
of different market structures. We use a restricted version of the model in this
paper to analyze welfare in three equilibria: a monopolist non-profit, monopolist
for-profit, and perfect competition. The focus on equilibrium precludes the
comparative static analysis on changes to market structure that we need for the
questions of interest to this paper.
In a recent related paper, Ahlin and Suandi (2018) empirically study deter-
minants of JL lending, and point to the same time trend away from JL that we
identify. They argue that the trend can in part be explained by MFIs reducing
the share of JL in their portfolios as they age, which they suggest could be
driven by gained experience in overcoming asymmetric information without the
use of JL. Because age effects are not identified separately from time effects,
they adopt a bounding approach that models the age effect as a step function in
age quintiles, as well as a Hausman-Taylor hybrid fixed-effects estimator. Our
analysis always controls flexibly for time (absorbing age effects), and therefore
provides a complementary explanation.
Existing empirical work comparing IL and JL tends to focus on comparing
the impact of credit under different contracts, or the relative performance of the
two contract forms on repayment and other outcomes. Gine´ and Karlan (2014)
show that converting joint liability groups to individual liability groups at an
MFI in the Philippines did not affect average repayment rates (the average effect
is a precisely-estimated zero). Carpena et al. (2013) study a natural experiment
in which an Indian MFI switched from using IL to JL, exploiting variation in
the switch date determined by the maturity of previous loans. They find a
substantial improvement in repayment rates, in line with the model we use in
this paper. Mahmud (2015) uses a similar strategy to study the decision by
a Pakistan MFI to switch to JL, and again finds positive repayment effects.
Attanasio et al. (2015) randomized Mongolian borrowers into either JL, IL or
a control (no credit treatment). They find some positive economic impacts
of access to JL credit, no significant impacts of IL credit, and no difference
in repayment rates. Overall, the evidence seems consistent with JL (weakly)
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improving repayment rates, as it does in our model, though it should be noted
that the two randomized studies do not find significant effects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the three stylized facts
that motivate the theory. Section 3 presents the model and the theoretical
analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 explores various
robustness checks. Section 6 provides a discussion of the role of social capital in
the model, and informal discussion of further extensions. Section 7 concludes.
Our Web Appendices describe the dataset construction, derivation of theoretical
results, and additional tables and figures.
2. Stylized facts
In this section we document three simple stylized facts. 1) The share of
for-profit MFIs has grown over time, indicating a shift away from non-profit
lending; 2) the average number of MFIs operating in each country has grown
over time, indicating increasing competitiveness in the sector; 3) the use of joint
liability has declined over time. The first two stylized facts relate to our notion
of commercialization, as capturing both the shift to for-profit lending and the
increase in competition in the sector. The third shows the changing lending
methodology that is the main outcome in our analysis. We defer a detailed
description of the dataset to section 4.1 and Web A.8
After introducing these three facts, we discuss the proxy variables that we use
to capture competitiveness in our main empirical analysis. Finally we provide
a brief discussion of drivers of changes in commercialization.
2.1. Stylized fact 1: shift to for-profit lending
The first stylized fact is reflected in panel (a) of Figure 1, which shows a
gradual increase in the fraction of MFIs that lend for profit over the period
1998–2009.
8We note that our related paper, de Quidt et al. (in press), includes the figures documenting
(1) and (2), citing this paper as their source.
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To create this figure, we construct a measure of the fraction of MFIs that
lend for profit, over time. Our dataset does not contain meaningful entry/exit
information during the panel period, but we can reconstruct the past evolution
of the microfinance sector by using information on MFI incorporation dates
and for-profit/non-profit status. Specifically, we take the universe of MFIs that
ever reported to MIX and that report incorporation dates and profit status.9
Under the admittedly strong assumption of no changes in profit status and no
differential exit by profit status, the incorporation dates allow us to examine
how for-profit and non-profit lending have evolved over time.
For each year, we plot the fraction of lenders that were incorporated on that
year or before, that are reported as lending for profit. The upward trend we
observe implies that for-profit lenders tend to have been incorporated later than
non-profits. Based on this measure we would conclude that the industry was
initially made up predominantly of non-profit lenders, but subsequent entry has
been dominated by for-profits.10
2.2. Stylized fact 2: growth in the number of lenders
To give a sense of how competitiveness of the microfinance sector has evolved,
we next study the evolution of the number of lenders per country, in panel (b)
of Figure 1. We take the universe of MFIs that ever reported to MIX and
that report founding dates, and use these to construct the number of MFIs
founded prior to each given year, finding that the average number of MFIs per
9See Web Appendix A for details on how these were collected.
10There are four potential biases in this figure. First, we cannot observe historical market
shares, so we weight each MFI equally. If non-profit MFIs have increased lending significantly
faster than for-profits, the true upward trend in for-profit market share would be lower. Sec-
ond, survivor bias: MFIs that shut down before data collection by MIX will not appear in the
data. If for-profits fail more frequently than non-profits, it could be that the true for-profit
share has not increased as much as it appears to have done. Third, we do not observe changes
in profit status, only the status as of 2011. However, inspecting changes in legal status (e.g.
NGO to non-bank financial intermediary) over 2008-2014, we suspect that these are relatively
rare compared to new entries, and changes are more likely to be from NGO to other forms
that are more likely to be for-profit, we provide further discussion on this below. Finally, we
can only include data for MFIs that report to MIX, including their profit status and founding
dates. If non-profits and for-profits’ report at different rates, and these rates are changing
over time, the picture would change. In general, we expect each of these concerns to primarily
affect the level of the for-profit share, rather than the qualitative trend.
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country roughly doubled over the same period, consistent with our narrative of
increasing competition in the industry.11
2.3. Stylized fact 3: decline of joint liability
The third and final stylized fact is captured in panel (c) of Figure 1, which
illustrates the change in MFI lending methodologies over time. This is challeng-
ing, because reporting limitations constrain us to examining within-MFI trends.
We do the best we can given the data limitations, and find evidence of a trend
toward IL in the 2008-2014 period.
For each MFI we compute, for each year it is available, the fraction of IL
loans. Not all MFIs report lending method in all years. Therefore looking
at cross-sectional means over time risks confounding changes in actual lending
practices with selection into and out of the sample. We instead plot only within-
MFI changes. In other words, we show the evolution of the average MFI’s IL
share over time, taking out changes in the composition of that average. We
regress IL shares on year and MFI fixed effects, weighting observations by the
number of loans, for the 583 MFIs that report lending methodology at least twice
in our sample. The graph then plots the year fixed effects. The weighting means
that the graph tracks the fraction of all loans made by this sample that were
under individual liability, and indicates a roughly 5 percentage point increase
in the share of IL loans over the period.
Web Appendix Figure C.4 includes confidence intervals which show that the
trend is statistically significant, and explores alternative methods to weight the
underlying data. Web Appendix Figure C.5 plots the trend graphs for each
possible panel definition in turn, i.e. restricting to MFIs observed at least 2
times, at least 3 times, etc. We lose approximately one sixth of the MFIs at
each step, but the basic trend is robustly preserved.
11As with stylized fact 1, we do not observe entry or exit during our sample period, but
we can again reconstruct historical entry patterns using founding dates. This will tend to
understate the number of lenders in operation because we do not observe founding dates for
all MFIs, because there may have been lenders operating in the past who shut down before
reporting to MIX, and because there may be other lenders currently in operation who do not
report to MIX.
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We believe this is the most thorough empirical demonstration of the trend
away from JL in the literature thus far. Gine´ and Karlan (2014) also mention
the trend. They document the fraction of MFIs in the MIX data that use either
individual, group or both types of loans for the years 2007–2009 (whereas we
examine portfolio shares). These figures also suggest a trend away from JL, but
the time series is short and the data are not adjusted for selective reporting (in
2007 just 31 institutions reported their lending methodology, hence our focus
on 2008-2014). Ahlin and Suandi (2018) use the same data that we use and
also study this trend.12 Their main focus is on how it relates to MFI aging, and
they also examine certain macroeconomic predictors of the trend. They do not
study market structure or commercialization.
2.4. Competitiveness proxy measures
As we discuss further in section 4.1, we do not have sufficient data to con-
struct a measure of microfinance sector competitiveness during the sample pe-
riod in which we also observe lending methodology (2008–2014), so instead we
use a proxy variable approach, based on three variables that are commonly re-
ferred to as measures of financial access or financial depth (see e.g. Levine, 2005;
Cˇiha´k et al., 2013).13 These are financial access, measured by a) Commercial
Bank Branch density and b) ATM density, and financial depth, measured by
c) the ratio of domestic credit provided by the financial sector to GDP. Our
primary analyses use the first principal component of these three variables.
We believe that these financial access measures constitute reasonable prox-
ies for competitiveness in our model, in which competition increases borrowers’
alternative credit options if they default at their current lender (furthermore, as
we argue in Section 3.8, our results extend to other notions of competitiveness).
12Our main analysis uses data that they kindly shared with us. They estimate time fixed
effects in regressions with other controls but do not quantitatively study the trend by itself,
in isolation from other regressors, as we do in the figures discussed in this section.
13These are available from the World Bank Development Indicators and have been collected
mainly through the Financial Access Surveys, maintained by the International Monetary Fund.
This data has been used in the past to study outreach of the financial sector, e.g. by Beck
(2007) or Ahlin et al. (2011).
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For the formal banking sector, Beck et al. (2004) suggests that financial access
and depth are positively associated with competition, and Cull et al. (2014)
argue using these measures that banks compete with MFIs. To the extent that
the formal sector competes with the microcredit sector, they are a direct mea-
sure of borrowers’ outside options. Additionally, they are expected to capture
underlying trends that spur formal sector development and microcredit growth.
Financial access has expanded steadily over time: the number of bank
branches per 1 million inhabitants has increased from 9.57 to 18.2 over our
sample period. The prevalence of ATMs follows a similar pattern. Financial
depth, as measured by domestic credit, has expanded by around 17.3% over the
sample period. We plot these trends in Figure 1 panel (d).
2.5. What drives commercialization?
We are not aware of good evidence for, nor do we model why the sector is be-
coming more commercialized. Our theoretical analysis takes the trends toward
a more competitive and for-profit microcredit industry as given and exogenous,
while our empirical analysis adopts different fixed-effects strategies with robust-
ness checks to address the most obvious endogeneity concerns (though we do
not claim to perfectly address endogeneity).
Cull et al. (2009) discuss the issue, and argue that commercialization may
in part reflect a change in the policy environment and donor preferences. They
write (p170–171):
In the 1980s and 1990s, policymakers took a big leap, arguing that
the new microfinance institutions should be profitable– or in the pre-
vailing code language, they should be “financially sustainable.” . . .
In this spirit, donors encouraged both nonprofit and for-profit micro-
finance institutions to raise interest rates. Use subsidies sparingly,
donors argued, and only in the start-up phase. Earn ample prof-
its and expand as rapidly as profits allow. Commercialize. Attract
private investors.
12
Our explicit focus is on the observable shift toward competitiveness and
for-profit motivation as described in the above quote. While potentially also
important, we do not model unobservable shifts in interest-rate setting policies
(in our model rates depend only on fundamentals and lender profit motivation)
or donor preferences (which might affect operating costs).
A plausible alternative explanation is simply that the industry is in transition
to a long-run competitive equilibrium, which began with the entry of (often
subsidized) non-profits.
3. Model
Our starting point is a model of credit under weak enforcement, as in Besley
and Coate (1995). In our model credit is demanded for (risky) investment pur-
poses because this naturally leads to a tractable framework in which the value of
credit access stems from the expected discounted value of future output. Given
recent evidence suggesting that the representative microcredit borrower does
not seem to be engaging in high-return investment activities (see e.g. Baner-
jee et al., 2015), this may be an unrealistic assumption. However, all that is
required for our core mechanism, which stems from a set of incentive compat-
ibility constraints, is that borrowers a) value credit access both today and in
the future, b) are tempted to default on their repayment obligations, and c) are
sometimes unable to repay their loans, none of which we view as controversial.
There is a population of atomistic, risk neutral borrowers. Each period they
have access to a productive technology that requires one unit of capital and
produces R > 1 units of output with probability p > 0 (success), and nothing
otherwise (failure). Borrowers do not have access to a saving technology so
must borrow one unit of capital each period if they wish to invest.14 Borrowers’
liability is limited to their cash on hand, so they cannot repay if unsuccessful.
14This is a common assumption in the literature, and some form of saving constraint is
required to avoid a Bulow and Rogoff (1989) unravelling of the dynamic repayment incentives
used by the lender. It does not appear unreasonable in the microcredit context, see e.g. Dupas
and Robinson (2013a,b).
13
They discount exponentially with discount factor δ.15
There are one or more lenders, who each face a gross opportunity cost of
funds equal to ρ. If the borrower is successful in obtaining a loan, she borrows
1 each period and repays gross interest rate r. If she defaults, her contract is
terminated and she receives no future loans from that lender. In the equilibria we
focus on she will repay with some probability pi (i.e. paying pir in expectation
each period), and her contract will be renewed with probability pi. If it is
terminated, she becomes “unmatched” and receives continuation value U (e.g.
the option value of waiting for a new lender to offer her a contract). The value
function of a borrower who has received a loan is therefore
V = pR− pir + δpiV + δ(1− pi)U = pR− pir
1− δpi +
δ(1− pi)U
1− δpi .
Lenders can offer either IL or JL contracts. An IL contract requires a bor-
rower to repay her loan, otherwise her contract is terminated. She faces one
choice: whether to repay when successful. If the contract makes her better off
repaying than defaulting, she repays whenever successful, i.e. with probability
piIL = p.
A JL contract binds together a pair of borrowers and requires both loans to
be repaid, otherwise both contracts will be terminated. This gives borrowers an
incentive to repay on behalf of an unsuccessful partner, an incentive that can
be strengthened by the use of social sanctions.16 However it might also induce
a successful borrower to default rather than repay on behalf of her unsuccessful
partner. In the latter case it is straightforward to show that IL can earn both
higher profits and higher borrower welfare than JL, so JL will not be offered.
15The benchmark model assumes the borrower wants to borrow every period, but easily
extends to the possibility that with some probability x she discovers at the beginning of the
period that she will never want to borrow again (e.g. because she loses access to the investment
technology, or because of a positive wealth shock). In this case, her effective discount factor
becomes δ′ = δ(1− x) because with probability x the continuation value of the loan contract
falls to zero. A similar modification can allow for the case where she only wants to borrow
infrequently.
16A possibility that we do not consider in this paper (because it does not arise in equilibrium
under our assumptions) but analyze extensively in de Quidt et al. (2016) is that IL borrowers
might also assist one another with repayment.
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In the former, both loans are repaid whenever at least one borrower succeeds,
with probability piJL = p(2− p).17 We define
q ≡ p(2− p).
Borrower welfare under IL and JL therefore equals:
V IL =
pR− pr
1− δp +
δ(1− p)U
1− δp (1)
V JL =
pR− qr
1− δq +
δ(1− q)U
1− δq . (2)
The first incentive constraint, IC1, is identical under IL or JL: the borrower
must be willing to repay her own loan (under JL: when her partner is also
repaying). If she does, she renews her contract and receives continuation value
V , if she does not, she becomes unmatched and receives U . The condition is
thus δV − r ≥ δU , which simplifies to:
r ≤ δpR− δ(1− δ)U ≡ rIC1(U). (3)
Under JL there is a second constraint, IC2: the borrower must be willing and
able to repay on behalf of her unsuccessful partner. Her choice is to either repay
two loans and renew her contract, receiving V , or default. If she defaults, her
contract is terminated and she faces a social sanction of size S, so she receives
U − S.18 Thus the condition is δV − 2r ≥ δ(U − S), or:
r ≤ δpR− δ(1− δ)U + δ(1− δq)S
2− δq =
rIC1(U) + δ(1− δq)S
2− δq ≡ rIC2(U, S). (4)
Only one of IC1 or IC2 can bind, depending on the level of S. IC2 is tighter if
rIC2(U, S) ≤ rIC1(U), or:
S ≤ pR− (1− δ)U ≡ S¯(U). (5)
17For simplicity, we assume throughout the symmetric equilibrium such that successful
borrowers always repay their own loan when their partner was successful, and repay both
when their partner was unsuccessful. This maximizes expected borrower welfare and has the
weakest incentive compatibility conditions over all (time-invariant) repayment rules.
18An obvious question is why the JL version of IC1 does not include an S term, i.e. why
does a JL borrower’s partner not sanction her for defaulting? The reason is that under JL,
the partner has no reason to threaten a social sanction in this case: if IC1 is violated it is
optimal for both borrowers to default.
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We take social capital, S, to be a measure of all the informal means borrowers
can use to persuade one another to assist with repayment. These can include
loss of reputation, loss of a friendship, shame, non-pecuniary punishments, et
cetera.19 We assume that S is symmetric within borrowing groups, is observable
to the lender (so the lender can base his contract offer on S), and distributed in
the population with cumulative density F (S). A weaker assumption that would
give the same qualitative conclusions would be that the lender bases contracts
on observable individual or community-level predictors of S.
For IC1 to hold it must be that V > U : alternative sources of credit can-
not be so freely available that the borrower is always better off defaulting on
her current loan and taking her outside option. We therefore assume there is
excess demand for credit (credit rationing), ensuring that a) lenders are free to
set the interest rate and b) lenders can always costlessly replace a terminated
borrower.20
Next, we must check whether the borrower is able to repay, i.e. check the
relevant limited liability constraint(s) (LLC). IC1 implies r < R, so the borrower
can always repay at least one loan. Under JL the borrower must sometimes repay
two loans, requiring 2r < R. For simplicity we impose a parameter restriction
that ensures that the LLC never binds. In equilibrium, IC1 ensures that r can
never exceed δpR, so we assume δpR < R2 or:
Assumption 1. δp < 12 .
In other words, incentive compatibility implies tighter constraints than limited
liability. Obviously this is a somewhat restrictive condition: the borrower’s in-
come when successful must exceed the full repayment of two loans. We note
that our qualitative results do not depend upon this and that the equivalent re-
striction would become weaker if we allowed for larger borrowing groups (so the
repayment burden can be split across more successful partners) or for borrower
19For further discussion, see de Quidt et al. (2016) and de Quidt et al. (in press).
20If the borrower’s outside option derives exclusively from access to alternative MFI lenders,
credit rationing is guaranteed in equilibrium (de Quidt et al., in press).
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output to take intermediate values between 0 and R (such that the unsuccessful
partner has some income that can contribute to her repayment, reducing the
burden on the successful partner).
Next, to focus on the choice between IL and JL, we assume that the lender
is always able to at least break even under an IL contract. In other words we
impose a lower bound on the absolute profitability of IL. We define a maximum
value for U , U¯ such that IC1 just binds at the zero-profit interest rate, i.e.
prIC1(U¯) = ρ.
Assumption 2. U ≤ U¯ ≡ δp2R−ρδp(1−δ) .
Assumption 2 implies that IC1 is also satisfied under JL at the zero profit JL
interest rate: qrIC1(U¯) > ρ, since q > p, which allows us to focus on IC2 in
the analysis below. If U > U¯ , IL makes a loss. This implies that both lender
types will either offer JL, or shut down if JL is also loss-making, so there is no
variation in contracts offered. We discuss the effects of relaxing the assumption
in section 5.6.
Our final parameter assumption affects the relative profitability of IL and
JL. JL is more profitable than IL if the maximum revenue under JL,
qmin{rIC1(U), rIC2(U, S)} (which is obtained when the tightest constraint binds),
is higher than the maximum revenue under IL, which is prIC1(U).
If JL is more profitable than IL (which we have assumed is always profitable)
for all values of S ≥ 0 then (as we show below), lenders will always offer JL.
In this case there is little interesting to say about the relationship between
commercialization and contract choice. We therefore focus our attention on the
more interesting case which obtains when IL is more profitable than JL at S = 0.
In other words, we assume that prIC1(U) > qrmin{rIC1(U), rIC2(U, 0)}. This
condition reduces to:
Assumption 3. p > δq.
If this assumption does not hold, JL is always offered. The assumption implies
that when S is small, IL is the more profitable contract, while for S sufficiently
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large JL is the more profitable contract.21 Therefore Assumption 3 implies there
exists a region over which IL is the more profitable and a region over which JL
is the more profitable contract.
Assumptions 1 and 3 can be neatly combined in the following condition:
δ < min
{
1
2p
,
1
2− p
}
Web Appendix Figure C.1 plots the values of (p, δ) that satisfy this condition.
3.1. Non-profit lender
The non-profit chooses the contract that maximizes borrower welfare, sub-
ject to IC1, IC2 and a zero-profit condition: pir ≥ ρ, where pi is the repayment
probability. We denote equilibrium values (for example, utilities, interest rates)
under non-profit lending with a “hat” (e.g. xˆ). The non-profit interest rates
under IL and JL are:
rˆIL ≡ ρ
p
rˆJL ≡ ρ
q
. (6)
Substituting for rˆIL and rˆJL, inspection of (1) and (2) reveals that Vˆ JL >
Vˆ IL. When the JL contract is incentive-compatible, borrowers are able to re-
pay more frequently, lowering their interest rate and increasing their contract
renewal probability. Therefore, the lender will always offer JL provided it is
profitable at rˆJL. This can be written as ρ ≤ qmin{rIC1(U), rIC2(U, S)}. As
discussed above, Assumption 2 implies that ρ ≤ qrIC1(U). Therefore we we can
focus attention on whether IC2 is satisfied, obtaining a threshold condition:
S ≥ max
{
0,
(2− δq)ρ− δq[pR− (1− δ)U ]
δq(1− δq)
}
≡ Sˆ(U). (7)
If S < Sˆ, IL is offered, if S ≥ Sˆ, JL is offered.
It could be that the second term in the maximum is negative, in which case
Sˆ(U) = 0 and the non-profit offers JL for all values of S.22 Sˆ(U) = 0 if:
U <
δqpR− (2− δq)ρ
δq(1− δ) ≡ U
21For intuition, note that when S is very large, IC1 becomes the binding constraint under
JL, and at this point JL is strictly more profitable than IL, because qrIC1(U¯) > prIC1(U¯).
22This follows because social sanctions cannot be negative, i.e. S ≥ 0
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A little algebra shows that U = U¯ − (p − δq)ρ/δq(1 − δ). Assumption 3 then
implies U < U¯ , so there always exists a region (U, U¯ ] over which the non-profit
offers IL to borrowers with sufficiently low values of S.
Our first result relates the non-profit’s use of JL to the level of competition.
Increasing competition is captured by an increase in the borrower’s outside
option, U . If she defaults on a loan from her current lender, she can go on to
obtain a loan elsewhere. This tightens both IC1 and IC2, since the maximum
interest rate at which repayment is incentive compatible under either contract
decreases.
Proposition 1. Sˆ′(U) ≥ 0, with the inequality strict for all U > U . In
other words, the minimum amount of social capital needed for joint liability to
break even is (weakly) increasing in the level of competition. Thus, competition
(weakly) increases individual liability lending by non-profits.
Competition improves the borrower’s outside option, reducing the cost of
losing her existing contract. As a result, for a given interest rate the minimum
level of social capital for a borrower to be willing to repay her partner’s loan is
increasing in competition.
3.2. For-profit lender
The for-profit lender, unsurprisingly, maximizes profits. We denote equi-
librium quantities under for-profit lending by a tilde (x˜). Since he can always
costlessly replace a terminated borrower next period, he does not discount fu-
ture profits from a given borrower, instead maximizing only per-period profit
Π = pir˜−ρ, and since costs are assumed to be the same under both contracts he
merely compares revenues pir˜ when choosing which contract to offer. Profits are
maximized at the maximum incentive-compatible interest rate, which under IL
is r˜IL(U) = rIC1(U). Under JL the maximum rate is the minimum of rIC1(U)
and rIC2(U, S), so r˜
JL(U, S) = min{rIC1(U), rIC2(U, S)}.23
23If the lender sets the JL interest rate higher than rIC2(U, S), then the borrowers repay
only when both are successful, with probability p2, and he cannot earn more than under IL.
If he sets r > rIC1(U, S) the borrowers always default.
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The lender offers JL when qr˜JL(U, S) ≥ pr˜IL(U), or:
S ≥ p(p− δq)[pR− (1− δ)U ]
q(1− δq) ≡ S˜(U). (8)
It is easy to check that S˜(U) ≥ Sˆ(U), with the relation holding strictly when
U < U¯ .24 Hence the for-profit is more likely to offer IL than the non-profit.
Proposition 2. For a given level of competition, U < U¯ , a for-profit lender is
more likely to offer individual liability than a non-profit: S˜(U) > Sˆ(U).
The intuition for the proposition is straightforward. The non-profit offers JL
whenever it breaks even, because JL maximizes borrower welfare. The for-profit
also requires JL to break even, but additionally it must be more profitable than
IL. Since this is a stricter condition, the for-profit ends up offering JL to fewer
borrowers.
We have assumed that the for-profit is myopic, ignoring the impact on future
profits of retaining a borrower for longer. The motivation for this assumption is
that lenders have limited capacity relative to demand, so the lender can easily
replace a defaulting borrower next period. However, it is easy to see that the
result also holds for a patient for-profit, who discounts the future with discount
factor β ∈ [0, 1]. Now the net present value of profits from a given borrower are
pir˜−ρ
1−βpi . The non-profit offers JL provided it is possible to break even with a JL
contract, which is equivalent to checking qr˜JL(U, S)−ρ ≥ 0. The for-profit offers
JL whenever it is more profitable than IL, i.e. when qr˜
JL(U,S)−ρ
1−βq ≥ pr˜
IL(U)−ρ
1−βp ,
which is a more restrictive condition for all β as pr˜
IL(U)−ρ
1−βp ≥ 0.
Next we consider the impact of competition on the for-profit’s use of JL.
Proposition 3. S˜′(U) < 0. In other words, the minimum amount of social
capital needed for joint liability to be more profitable than individual liability is
decreasing in the level of competition. Thus, competition decreases individual
liability lending by for-profits.
24The expressions for Sˆ and S˜ coincide at U = U¯ , i.e. when U is so high that IL is just
breaking even.
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The result follows from the fact that revenue under JL is less sensitive to
U than under IL. Under IL the relevant incentive constraint (IC1) determines
the maximum single payment the borrower is willing to make, δ(V −U) = r, so
increases in U are passed through to decreases in r. Under JL, the relevant in-
centive constraint (IC2) determines the maximum double payment the borrower
will make, δ(V − U + S) = 2r, so for a given decrease in the left-hand-side, the
interest rate r falls by half as much.25 Therefore, profits decrease faster under
IL than JL, which can make JL more profitable when U is sufficiently high.
Collecting results, we see that competition decreases JL usage by non-profits.
Conversion to for-profit also decreases JL usage, but competition increases JL
usage by for-profits. Finally, an observation:
Observation 1. For a given level of social capital, S, an increase in U cannot
induce both the non-profit to switch from joint liability to individual liability and
the for-profit to switch from individual liability to joint liability.
The observation follows formally from Proposition 2, which shows that for
profits always have a higher threshold than non-profits for offering JL. Intu-
itively, if the non-profit switches to IL it is because JL can no longer break
even, thus the for-profit will not switch to JL.
3.3. Summary and graphical representation
In this section we provide a short summary of our predictions for lenders’
contract choice, and a graphical representation of the findings.
Non-profit lenders are assumed to offer the contract that maximizes borrower
welfare, provided they can break even doing so. Our model predicts that JL is
preferred by borrowers due to its insurance properties, so the lender offers JL
at the zero-profit interest rate when this satisfies IC1 and IC2, and otherwise
offers IL. Importantly, unlike the for-profit, the non-profit will offer JL even if
25Note that V also depends on both U and r, with different slopes under IL and JL,
complicating the relation between U and r. Inspection of rIC1 and rIC2 reveals that
drIC2(U,U)
dU
drIC1(U)
dU
= 1
2−δq ∈ (0.5, 1).
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IL earns higher profits. For-profit lenders offer whichever contract maximizes
profits, irrespective of borrower welfare. Thus their decision depends on the
relative tightness of IC1 under IL to IC1 and IC2 under JL.
Under our Assumption 2, IC1 is always satisfied under IL and JL. Addition-
ally JL is more profitable than IL if IC1 is binding, since the repayment rate is
higher under JL. That enables us to summarize the lenders’ choices simply, in
table 1.
Individual liability Joint liability
Non-profit
Interest rate rˆIL = ρp rˆ
JL = ρq
Contract offered if rˆJL > rIC2(U, S) rˆ
JL ≤ rIC2(U, S)
For-profit
Interest rate r˜IL = rIC1(U) r˜
JL = min{rIC1(U), rIC2(U, S)}
Contract offered if pr˜IL > qr˜JL pr˜IL ≤ qr˜JL
Table 1: Lender’s contract choice and interest rate
Figure 2 shows the combinations of contracts offered by non-profit and for-
profit lenders for different combinations of U and S. For clarity, we first plot
the regions separately for the two lender types, then combine them on a single
plot. The graphs plot the two functions, Sˆ and S˜, the threshold U¯ implied
by Assumption 2, and shade the regions corresponding to different contract
combinations.26
Assumption 2 restricts U to the region where IL is always profitable, which is
bounded by U¯ . The plots also include the region U > U¯ where IL is loss-making
but JL is not for sufficiently high S, in which case both lender types offer JL.
We discuss the relaxation of Assumption 2 below, in section 3.6.
The figures show clearly the three key parameter regions identified by the
theory: a region with low S where both lenders offer IL, a region with inter-
26The graphs can also be interpreted as plotting the incentive constraints IC1 and IC2,
where they coincide with zero profits. Specifically, U¯ plots the level of U such that prIC1 = ρ,
i.e. IL earns zero profits. Sˆ(U) plots the values of S and U where IC2 is tighter than IC1 and
JL earns zero profits, i.e. qrIC2(U, S) = ρ.
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mediate S where for-profits offer IL and non-profits offer JL, and a region with
high S where both offer JL. In the additional region introduced by relaxing
Assumption 2, where both S and U are large, both lenders also offer JL.
Web Appendix figure C.2 shows how the contract regions change as we vary
the model parameters ρ, R, δ and p.
In typical models a non-profit is indistinguishable from the limit case of a
for-profit that is operating in a competitive equilibrium.27 Interestingly this is
not the case in our model. We analyze how lenders respond to changes in the
competitive environment, and therefore necessarily are studying behavior out of
competitive equilibrium. The contract offered by a non-profit in this setting can
be different from what a for-profit would do, were it in competitive equilibrium.
This is easiest to see by inspecting Figure 2. Take for instance the case where
S and U are initially equal to zero. The non-profit would choose to offer JL in
such a setting. However, as U increases due to entry, we cross the Sˆ line (JL
ceases to be feasible). In other words, when S is low, the non-profit will offer
JL if U is also sufficiently low, while a competitive non-profit will never offer
JL. We provide further discussion of competitive equilibrium in Section 3.7.
3.4. Joint liability over time
Now we use the assumed heterogeneity of S in the population to study
changes in the aggregate level of IL and JL lending. We first derive the steady
state share of borrowers receiving IL loans for a given share of for-profit lenders
in the market, which we denote by f , and a given level of the borrowers’ outside
option U . Then we analyze comparative statics on these variables. We treat f
and U as exogenous and independently varying since these are the commercial-
ization variables that we study in the data, and we do not observe in the data
an underlying factor that can be argued to cause both.
We assume that lenders are atomistic with a fixed capacity of two borrowers
per period, enabling them to each serve either two IL borrowers or one JL group.
27We thank the editor and an anonymous referee for prompting us to explore this compar-
ison.
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At the end of each period, lenders terminate all defaulting IL borrowers or JL
groups. We then make two technical assumptions for simplicity. First, because
IL defaults can leave lenders with a single vacancy, we assume that surviving IL
borrowers are reshuffled to fill vacancies in other equivalent IL branches. This
ensures that (with the exception of a zero measure of “remainder” borrowers
when there is an odd number of defaults) branches either have two or zero
vacancies at the beginning of the next period, and can therefore freely offer
IL or JL. Second, a borrower whose contract is terminated rejoins the pool of
unmatched borrowers and draws a new potential borrowing partner and value
of S from F . This ensures that S is always distributed according to F in the
pool. Atomistic lenders imply that borrowers’ histories do not matter since they
will never re-match with a previous lender.
Borrowers without a current loan contract receive utility U . At the beginning
of a period, branches with vacant spaces fill them by drawing a pair of borrowers
at random from the pool of unmatched borrowers. They observe the pair’s value
of S, and offer them either an IL or JL contract which determines their value for
V . Non-profits offer IL when S < Sˆ(U), i.e. with probability F (Sˆ(U)), and for-
profits offer IL when S < S˜(U), with probability F (S˜(U)). If a borrower rejects,
she goes back to the pool until next period. Since the lender will always offer
a contract such that V > U (otherwise the incentive conditions are violated),
borrowers always accept.
Denote by ηˆ(U) (η˜(U)) the steady-state fraction of non-profit (for-profit)
lenders offering IL. When filling a vacancy at a non-profit (for-profit) lender,
a borrower receives an IL contract with probability F (Sˆ(U)) (F (S˜(U))), since
we assumed she her value of S was drawn anew from F . However, IL and
JL borrowers default and re-enter the pool at different rates (1 − p, and 1 − q
respectively), so JL groups survive for longer. As a result in steady state, where
the flows into and out of IL/JL are equalized, the fraction of IL borrowers will
be smaller than F (S) and the fraction of JL borrowers larger than 1− F (S).
Solving for the steady states, we obtain ηˆ(U) = F (Sˆ(U))(1−p)
1−F (Sˆ(U))p < F (Sˆ(U)) and
24
η˜(U) = F (S˜(U))(1−p)
1−F (S˜(U))p < F (S˜(U)). The steady state JL shares are 1 − ηˆ(U) =
1−F (Sˆ(U))
1−F (Sˆ(U))p and 1− η˜(U) =
1−F (S˜(U))
1−F (S˜(U))p . Derivations are given in the Appendix.
With these objects in hand, the steady state IL share in the market is η(U) =
fη˜(U) + (1− f)ηˆ(U). How does the IL share change over time? It depends on
the change in U and the change in f . We can write it as:
dη
dt
=
df
dt
[η˜(U)− ηˆ(U)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
dU
dt
(1− p)
f F ′(S˜(U))S˜′(U)(1− pF (S˜(U)))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+(1− f) F
′(Sˆ(U))Sˆ′(U)
(1− pF (Sˆ(U)))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
 .
An increase in the share of for-profits increases the share of IL lending, as
for-profits demand more social capital to offer JL. The effect of an increase in
the borrowers’ outside option (for example, because of an increase in competi-
tiveness) is ambiguous, as it increases IL lending by non-profits and JL lending
by for-profits. However when the initial share of for-profits is low (f close to
zero), the effect of increasing U will also be to increase η.
Observation 2. Provided the initial share of for-profits in the market is suffi-
ciently low, concurrent growth in for-profit lending and competition lead to an
overall increase in IL lending.
3.5. Other sources of heterogeneity
In our analysis so far we have allowed S to vary but held other model pa-
rameters fixed. In this section we discuss two other dimensions: variation in
the cost of capital, ρ, across lenders, and variation in the return to capital, R,
since for both we can derive analytic cutoffs for lenders to offer JL contracts.
We propose an empirical test based on the results for ρ, which is in principle ob-
servable in our data, and we also perform our main analysis controlling for GDP
per capita, which may at least partly reflect differences in returns to capital.
We do not formally analyze variation in δ and p, which do not yield in-
terpretable analytic expressions (and which are anyway not observable in the
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data). However, Web Appendix Figure C.2 shows how changes to the model
parameters shift the regions over which different contract combinations are of-
fered.
3.5.1. Variation in ρ
The non-profit lender offers JL whenever JL breaks even, and otherwise
switches to IL (which is assumed to be profitable by Assumption 2). The anal-
ogous condition to (7) is:
ρ ≤ q δpR− δ(1− δ)U + δ(1− δq)S
2− δq
The for-profit lender offers whichever contract earns the highest per-period
revenue. As a result, the cost of capital does not enter into their decision about
which loan type to offer.
In sum, the cost of capital is not predicted to affect the contract choice
of for-profits, but higher-cost non-profits are more likely to offer IL. This has
two implications. First, if changes in the cost of capital are associated with
changes in commercialization (or our proxy variables), we might misattribute
cost of capital affects to commercialization. Second, if non-profits have different
operating costs than for-profits, the level difference in usage of IL may partly
reflect differences in costs.28
The robustness check described in Section 5.3 adds measures of lenders’
costs to our main regressions. We do not see much in the way of a systematic
relationship with lending methodology, and the results are quite noisy. However,
encouragingly, the main commercialization effects are robust to including these
measures, suggesting their omission is not an important confound.
3.5.2. Variation in R
Increases in borrower income upon success, R, affect the amount of interest
borrowers are willing to repay under both contracts, relaxing IC1 and IC2. This
28Indeed, in our sample, the cost variables we use are weakly negatively correlated with
non-profit status. This would tend to increase JL usage by non-profits, relative to for-profits,
potentially reinforcing our results.
26
makes both contracts more profitable, and hence JL more feasible. Therefore
increases in R increase JL lending by non-profits. To see this, we rearrange (7),
finding that JL is offered provided:
R ≥ 2− δq
δpq
ρ+
(1− δ)
p
U − (1− δq)
p
S
The maximum repayable interest rate under JL, determined by IC2, is less
sensitive to R than the interest rate under IL. This is because a borrower has to
be willing to repay two loans under JL, so requires larger compensating increases
in the return to capital for a given increase in the interest rate. To see this, we
rearrange (8). We find that the for-profit offers JL if:
R ≤ (2− p)(1− δq)
p(p− δq) S +
(1− δ)
p
U
Higher values of R increase the likelihood the lender switches to IL.
One implication of this is that if, as argued by Cull et al. (2009), non-
profits tend to serve poorer borrowers (which may be partially captured by
lower returns to investment), this will tend to reduce their ability to offer JL.
As a result, we might underestimate what would be the difference in usage of
JL between non-profits and for-profits for comparable borrowers. However, the
qualitative comparative static effect of changes in U does not depend on this
level difference. While we do not observe borrower incomes directly, one of
our empirical robustness checks includes GDP per capita, interacted with the
lender’s profit status. Encouragingly, our main results are robust to including
these controls.
3.6. Relaxing restrictions on the size of U
Assumption 2 imposes an upper bound on U , U¯ , that ensures that IL is
always profitable and therefore restricts the lenders’ choice to a decision between
offering IL and JL contracts, simplifying the analysis. In this section we relax
the assumption, allowing U to exceed U¯ .
When U > U¯ the lender’s options are to offer JL or to shut down. Lenders
can offer JL without making a loss provided revenue at the tighter of IC1 and
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IC2 exceeds the cost of capital. IC1 is satisfied provided ρ < qrIC1(U), which
reduces to:
U ≤ δpqR− ρ
δq(1− δ) ≡ U¯
while IC2 is satisfied provided S ≥ Sˆ(U) as before. In sum, when U ∈ (U¯ , U¯ ],
both lenders offer JL when S ≥ Sˆ(U), and otherwise shut down. When U > U¯
both lenders shut down.
What are the implications for contract offerings? Consider first an environ-
ment where U is increasing and S is fixed. The reader may find it helpful for
intuition to consult Figure 2.
For the non-profit there are two cases. If S ≥ Sˆ(U¯) then the lender offers
JL for all U until it makes a loss, i.e. for all U ≤ min{Sˆ−1(S), U¯} (i.e. until the
tighter of IC1 and IC2 is violated). If S < Sˆ(U¯) then everything goes through
as in the prior analysis, and the lender shuts down at U = U¯ . In other words
the predicted monotonicity of contract offerings is preserved – either the lender
always offers JL, they offer JL for low U and IL for high U , or they always offer
IL.
For the for-profit there are three cases. First, if S ≤ Sˆ(U¯)29 (i.e., if JL is loss
making at U¯) the lender offers IL for all U ≤ U¯ and shuts down at U¯ . Second,
if S > S˜(0), i.e. if JL is always more profitable than IL, the lender offers JL
for all U until it makes a loss, i.e. for all U ≤ min{Sˆ−1(S), U¯}. Finally, in the
intermediate case S ∈ [Sˆ(U¯), S˜(0)), IL is initially more profitable and the lender
switches to JL at U = S˜−1(S). It then continues to offer JL until JL makes a
loss, i.e. for all U ≤ min{Sˆ−1(S), U¯}. Once again, the monotonicity of the prior
analysis is preserved: either the lender always offers IL, always JL, or initially
IL, switching to JL for high U .
We summarize the above in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. For homogenous S in the population, individual liability usage
is weakly increasing in U for non-profits, and weakly decreasing for for-profits.
29Note that in Figure 2 the Sˆ function is labeled “JL zero profits.”
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The more nuanced case is where a given lender serves heterogenous borrow-
ers, which is likely the case in our data. For example, the lender may have
some branches in low S locations and others in high S locations. How does the
lender’s share of JL contracts evolve as competition increases? Again we refer
the reader to Figure 2 for intuition.
The for-profit case is simple. The lender’s general tendency to increase the
use of JL as U increases is reinforced by the fact that IL lending shuts down
altogether at a lower value of U than JL lending. However for the non-profit
lender, the portfolio share of JL may evolve non-monotonically as U increases.
This is because there is a general tendency for IL usage to increase as U increases
(Proposition 4), but at U = U¯ then IL lending shuts down altogether, i.e. the
portfolio share of IL drops to zero. So we might observe IL shares increasing in
competition up to a critical level, before dropping to zero. We summarize these
findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. For heterogenous S in the population, individual liability usage
remains weakly decreasing in U for for-profits. For non-profits individual liabil-
ity usage is weakly increasing in U , before decreasing discontinuously to zero at
U = U¯ .
However, it is less clear that we would expect to observe such a relationship in
equilibrium. The argument for IL lending to shut down requires competition for
these borrowers to be sufficiently intense (i.e., their outside option is sufficiently
good) that no lender can profitably lend to them. This is unlikely to be an
equilibrium. Because we are interested in changes in competitiveness in this
paper, deriving the full competitive equilibrium is beyond the scope of our
analysis, but we provide some discussion in the next section.
In sum, our empirical prediction for the relationship between competition
and IL usage is preserved for for-profit lenders, but is potentially non-monotone
for non-profits. Therefore in our empirical work we perform a robustness check
in which we include only lenders that offered at least some individual liability
loans, from which we infer that U ≤ U¯ in the locations in which these lenders
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operate.
3.7. Endogenizing U
Ideally, we would like to endogenize U as a function of the scale of lending rel-
ative to the borrower population (since this determines how long an unmatched
borrower must wait for a loan) and the share of for-profits (since for-profits
charge higher interest rates and so are a less attractive outside option). It is
straightforward to do so in competitive equilibrium with homogeneous S, i.e.
when F is degenerate, and we do so in de Quidt et al. (in press) in order to
make statements about aggregate welfare. When S is homogeneous a given
lender type (non-profit/for-profit) either offers only IL or JL loans. In compet-
itive equilibrium the lender’s motivation does not matter: except for knife-edge
cases there is just one feasible contract that breaks even. We show that the level
of social capital required for the competitive market to offer JL is higher than a
monopolist non-profit, and lower than a monopolist for-profit. In other words,
transition from an uncompetitive, not-for-profit industry to a competitive one
increases the likelihood that IL is used.
However, the model in this paper necessarily focuses on behavior out of
competitive equilibrium, to analyze the effect of changing lender motivation
and market competitiveness on the contracts offered. Solving for the equilib-
rium value of U and deriving comparative statics is much more complex in
this setting. For this reason, we use our “reduced form” analysis which takes
U as given to motivate the below empirical work, in which we test the model’s
three main predictions: that for-profits are more likely to use IL, that increasing
competitiveness increases IL use by non-profits, and decreases it by for-profits.
Appendix B.2 outlines how to derive the equilibrium value of U when U is as-
sumed to capture only the possibility of obtaining a loan from a competitor
lender in future, and shows (in a restricted case) that U is increasing in the
number of lenders in the market.
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3.8. Ex-ante competition
So far we have modeled the effects of competition only through the borrower’s
outside option upon default, i.e. competition is ex-post, only affecting behavior
after the contract is accepted. This is natural because we assumed throughout
that credit is scarce relative to the number of potential borrowers, such that
lenders have market power in setting prices but must pay attention to borrowers’
ex-post incentive to repay. However the model does allow us to think in a simple
way about ex-ante competition, whereby increased competition constrains the
prices lenders can charge or face losing their clients.
There are three natural ways to model ex-ante competition. The first is that
competition acts as a simple cap on the interest rate that lenders can charge
under either contract, r ≤ r¯. This has no effect on the contract offering of
non-profits, but may cause them to shut down entirely, while it predicts that
for-profits increase their use of JL, as in Proposition 3. Non-profits already earn
zero profits, so if the cap is binding they must shut down.30 For-profits offer
the profit maximizing contract, and charge higher interest rates under IL than
JL. Therefore, the cap binds first on IL, reducing its profitability and increasing
the attractiveness of JL. If it binds on both contracts, the lender will offer JL
for sure since the interest rates are equalized but the repayment rate is higher
under JL.
Second, ex-ante competition might manifest as a floor on borrower welfare
that the contract must meet or exceed. Call this value V . Since the non-profit
maximizes borrower welfare, once again this constraint either has no effect or
puts it out of business. Turning to the for-profits, we require V˜ IL ≥ V and
V˜ JL ≥ V . Using expressions (1) and (2), and setting V˜ IL = V˜ JL = V (i.e., the
constraint binds), we obtain the implied upper bounds on revenue under IL and
30Notably, the cap doesn’t induce switching between contract types. If they were offering
IL before the cap we know that JL is not profitable, while because IL rates are higher, if the
cap is binding on JL it already rendered IL unprofitable.
31
JL:
Revenue
IL
= prIL = pR+ δ(1− p)U − (1− δp)V
Revenue
JL
= qrJL = pR+ δ(1− q)U − (1− δq)V .
Taking the difference, we obtain Revenue
JL −RevenueIL = δp(1− p)(V − U).
Noting that IC1 requires V > U , so the constraint can only bind when V > U ,
we learn that the constraint is tighter on IL revenue than JL revenue, and
therefore, to the extent that it is binding, will also push the lender toward
offering JL, again in line with Proposition 3.
Finally, we could conceptualize ex-ante competition as putting an upper
bound on profits, i.e. Π = pir− ρ ≤ Π¯. Assuming Π¯ ≥ 0, for the non-profit this
is never binding, since it earns zero profits, so once again there is no effect. For
the for-profit it either has no effect or makes it indifferent between the contracts.
It maximizes profits, pir − ρ, so this constraint only affects the profitability of
the most profitable contract, not their (strict) ordering.
We sum up the findings with the following observation:
Observation 3. Ex-ante competition that increases with commercialization weakly
reinforces the qualitative predictions of our main theory. The non-profit’s con-
tract choices are unaffected, while the for-profit is either unaffected or increases
his use of JL in line with Proposition 3.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Data
The dataset we work with come from MIXMarket.org (henceforth MIX), an
organization that collects, validates and publishes financial performance data of
MFIs around the world. The MIX is the largest and most comprehensive source
of data on microfinance institutions. For example, in 2011, 1,598 MFIs reported
data on loan portfolio value and loans outstanding to the MIX. Their combined
gross loan portfolio had a value of USD 91.6 billion across 154 million loans.
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Our main estimating sample contains financial data for 548 MFIs across a
total of 2,573 observations in the period 2008–2014. This comprises approxi-
mately one quarter of the 2,211 MFIs and 8,520 total observations reported to
the MIX in this seven year period.31 We also replicate our results in an alter-
nate sample that contains 874 MFIs but only years 2008–2011. We describe the
construction of the datasets in Web Appendix A.
Our focus in this paper is to highlight trends in lending methodology. The
MIX is the only data source of which we are aware that has collected this
data systematically over time. Lending methodology, according to the MIX,
is categorized into three categories: Individual, Solidarity Group and Village
Banking/Self Help Group. We treat Individual loans as IL and Solidarity Group
and village banking/self help groups as JL.32 Using these data we construct
MFI-level IL portfolio shares, “IL shares.”
Lending methodology information is provided by MFIs in the Gross Loan
Portfolio report (measured by value) and/or in the Number of Loans Outstand-
ing report. In the paper we mostly focus on regressions based on the fraction of
the number of loans made under IL, since this is the only measure available in
the longer panel we focus on. Our shorter, wider panel does contain the value-
based measure and we show that our results are robust to using this measure.
In a world of homogeneous borrowers or atomistic lenders (as in the benchmark
model), a given lender’s IL share would be either zero or one. When lenders
face heterogeneous borrowers, for instance because they have some branches in
31This dataset relies on data kindly provided to us by Chris Ahlin.
32The MIX is not explicit about whether joint liability is used; its definition reads “Solidarity
Group lending refers to the use of groups for disbursement of funds and collection of repayment
on loans to either the group as a whole or to the individual members of that group. Borrowers
of such groups often bear joint and several liability for the repayment of all loans to the
group and its members. This group liability may also determine credit decisions made by the
institution. Solidarity Groups vary in the degrees to which they use groups for credit decisions,
disbursement, collection, or to reduce credit risk. For this standard, loans are considered to be
of the Solidarity Group methodology when some aspect of loan consideration depends on the
group, including credit analysis, liability, guarantee, collateral, and loan size and conditions.”.
Other authors taking a similar classification approach to us include Cull et al. (2007; 2014)
and Mersland and Øystein Strøm (2009). To the extent that some of these loans are not true
JL, we must make the identifying assumption that changes in IL shares reflect true changes
in methodology, and not classification.
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locations with high S and some with low S, their aggregate portfolio will contain
a mixture of IL and JL loans.
The main weakness of the MIX data is selection: the MFIs who report
methodology data may not be representative of the population of MFIs, either
because of missing observations (an MFI does not report in a given year) or
missing variables (the MFI does not report one of our key measures in a given
year). Because of these concerns, we work throughout with different sources of
“within” variation (within region, country, MFI), based on two panel sampling
frames. We study a “fully balanced” panel of 111 MFIs, which report lending
method by number of loans for all seven years, and a “weakly balanced” panel
of 548 MFIs, who report lending methodology by number of loans at least twice.
In view of selection concerns, we note that the MFIs that report lending
methodology comprise a reasonable share of all loans in the MIX market dataset.
The weakly balanced panels accounts for around 30 % of the value of all loans
outstanding across our sample period (the 111 institutions that we observe in
every year are of course more selected, making up around 5% of the total value).
We are able to check whether our two panel definitions appear representative of
the full set of MFIs that reported to MIX. Table 2 presents summary statistics
for the full sample, the weakly balanced and the strongly balanced sample.33
We perform t-tests to compare the means of key observables between the MFIs
included in each panel and those excluded. Overall the two panel definitions
look fairly representative of the full dataset, in particular on our key IL share
and profit status variables, though we do find significant differences in some
other variables.
For-profit/non-profit status (“profit status”) is recorded as a static variable.
One concern might be that MFIs have changed profit status over time without
us knowing. We do have data on transitions of legal status up to 2011. Legal
status and profit status are very tightly related. Most (88 percent) non-profit
33Because not every MFI is observed every year, we report the 2009 values where available
(since 2009 has the greatest data availability), otherwise we take the closest available datapoint
(averaging 2008 and 2010 when both are available).
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MFIs have either Credit Union/Cooperative or NGO as legal status (see Web
Appendix Table C.1). Given the tight correlation between profit status and
legal status, and given that a robustness check that removes institutions that
changed legal status does not change our results, we think that unobserved
changes in profit status are unlikely to endanger our results.
A conventional approach to measuring competition would be to construct
market-level concentration indices. This is the approach taken by Baquero et al.
(forthcoming), who use proprietary rating agency data to construct Herfindahl
indices, studying the effect of concentration on interest rates in the microcredit
sector. It is unfortunately not possible, given the incomplete reporting to MIX,
to construct plausible concentration measures using our data. We have argued
above that our weakly and strongly balanced panels are reasonably representa-
tive of the typical MFI in the full sample. We construct portfolio shares at the
MFI level based on the relative size of the MFI’s reported IL and JL portfolios.
We then use fixed effects to isolate plausibly exogenous sources of variation (in
the limit, within-MFI variation) to address remaining selection concerns, so as
to understand how the lending methodology of a typical MFI relates to com-
mercialization. But to construct plausible country-level concentration measures
we would need to observe a stable and representative sample of MFIs at the
country level, and then use the variation between MFIs in portfolio size to mea-
sure concentration. The amount of selection in and out of the sample due to
reporting on a given year makes it difficult to do this plausibly.34
We use three proxies for the extent of credit market competition, which
enters the borrowers’ outside option, U , in the model. Our proxies are the
number of commercial bank branches per million people, the number of ATMs
per million people, and the value of domestic credit provided by the financial
sector as a share of GDP. These data come from the Financial Access Survey
collected by the International Monetary Fund. They have been used in the past
34Ideally we would also want to observe entry and exit, but in our data, the latest founding
date is 2009 and we cannot distinguish an MFI that exits the market from one that simply
ceases to report to MIX.
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to study outreach of the financial sector, for example, by Beck (2007), Ahlin
et al. (2011), Levine (2005), and Cˇiha´k et al. (2013), and are incorporated
in the World Development Indicators. In most of our regressions we use the
first principal component of these three indicators, standardized to mean zero,
standard deviation one, to proxy for credit market competition (details are given
in the Appendix). We also perform our analysis for each indicator separately.
These and other country-level observables are summarized in Table 3.
4.2. Empirical Specification
We test three predictions of the model, that (1) non-profits use JL relatively
more than for-profits; (2) that competition increases JL use by for-profits; and
(3) competition decreases JL use by non-profits.
To test these predictions, we estimate the following main specification:
ILicrt = αNPi + η Cct + γNPi × Cct + X′ictβ + aicr + bt + icrt. (9)
Here, ILicrt measures the share of individual liability loans, measured either
based on Number of Loans or based on the Gross Loan Portfolio of an MFI i in
country c, region r, and year t. NPi is an indicator variable for whether MFI i is
a non-profit, while Cct is a country-year level measure of competition. aicr is an
MFI, country, or region fixed effect, and bt is a year fixed effect. For robustness
checks, we also control for further covariates that vary at the country level or
the MFI level and are included in Xict; these are discussed further below.
Mapping the tested predictions into parameter estimates: (1) non-profits
have lower IL shares (α < 0); (2) competition decreases the use of IL by for-
profits (η < 0); (3) competition increases the use of IL by non-profits (η+γ > 0).
We additionally test whether the effect of competition on non-profit IL shares
is more positive than on for-profits (γ > 0).
We exploit variation at two levels. First, we exploit variation across MFIs
within a region or country in order to estimate the coefficient α, since the non-
profit indicator does not vary within MFI. For these specifications, we control
for region or country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Secondly, we exploit
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variation within MFIs over time, in order to more cleanly identify how changes
in competition Cct affect for-profit MFIs differently from non-profit MFIs. In
these specifications we cannot estimate α because it is collinear with the fixed
effects.
Sample sizes can change a little throughout the analysis, reflecting non-
availability of some variables for some observations.
4.3. Main Results
The main results are presented in Table 4. We present results for both
the strongly and weakly balanced panels. The results are strongly supportive of
Propositions 2 (non-profits use IL less) and 3 (for profits decrease IL usage when
competition increases). They are less supportive of Proposition 1, which predicts
a positive effect of competition on IL usage by non-profits. Our estimates are
more consistent with a zero effect.
On average, we estimate that non-profits have lower IL shares, by around
10–20 percentage points. A 1 standard deviation increase in our competition
measure is associated with a decrease in IL usage by for-profits, estimated at
around 6–8 percentage points when country or MFI fixed effects are included.
We find strong support for non-profits responding differently–the interaction
coefficient γ is consistently positive and significant when country or MFI fixed
effects are included. However, the estimated net effect (η+ γ), while positive in
most specifications, is close to zero and never significant.
5. Robustness
5.1. Alternative sampling frame
We might be concerned about representativeness of the MFIs in our main
sample, which were not selected at random. Table 5 Panel A replicates our
analysis in an alternative sampling frame that includes a more complete set of
MFIs, at the cost of shortening the panel to 2008–2011. We find extremely
similar results to our main specification, despite the number of MFIs in the
balanced panel more than tripling, suggesting that sample selection (at least
between these two samples) is not an important driver of the findings.
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We might also be concerned that measuring IL shares by number of loans
overweights small loans. We therefore in table 5 Panel B replicate the analysis
and results for IL shares measured by value (which are available in our second
sample) rather than by number, again obtaining very similar results.
5.2. Country- and MFI-level confounds
The competition proxies may be capturing other macroeconomic trends or
MFI characteristics. For example, if individual loans are difficult to administer
in rural areas, differences in urbanization might be driving the effects we see.
Or perhaps the shift towards IL lending reflects the growth of mobile banking,
which can substitute for the transaction cost-lowering benefits of group lending.
Appendix Table C.2 controls for level effects and and interactions with the
non-profit indicator for additional country level covariates in case the competi-
tion proxy is also proxying for these variables. We include the urban population
share, mobile phones per 100 people, GDP per capita, service/industry sector
shares in GDP, and foreign aid, all taken from the World Development Indica-
tors. The signs, magnitudes and the precision of our main coefficients are robust
to the inclusion of these additional controls. This suggests that the competition
proxy measure is capturing distinct forces to changes in e.g. borrower incomes
or country demographics.
Appendix Table C.3 checks robustness to inclusion of further control vari-
ables that vary at the country and MFI level. We control for non-linear country-
specific trends (using country-year fixed effects). This precludes estimation of
the direct effect of the competition proxies (so we cannot test η < 0 or η+γ > 0),
but we can still exploit within-country variation to analyze the differences in be-
havior of non-profits and for-profits, testing whether α < 0 and γ > 0. We also
control for some MFI-level indicators (and/or fixed effects): a static measure
capturing the MIX Market’s assessment of the sustainability of an MFI’s oper-
ations (“Diamonds”), and time-varying measures (namely, Capital to Asset Ra-
tio, Debt to equity ratio, Average loan balance per borrower, Return on assets,
Financial revenue/Assets, Yield on gross portfolio, Financial expense/assets ra-
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tio, and Operating expense/assets ratio). We lose some observations as not all
variables are available for all MFIs. The coefficients remain stable relative to
the main specifications, consistently estimating a lower IL share for non-profits
and a more positive effect of competition on IL lending by non-profits than
for-profits.35
5.3. Cost of capital
As discussed in section 3.5, lenders’ cost of capital also affects the choice
between individual and joint liability. Specifically, higher-cost non-profits are
more likely to offer individual liability, as IC2 is less likely to be satisfied.
This is important to check because our proxy variables might be associated
with lenders’ cost of capital, for example because for-profit lenders have access
to different funding sources than non-profits or because increased competition is
associated with new funding sources coming available. If so, our main regressions
could be omitting an important confound.
We explore this prediction empirically by including MFI-level measures of
either total costs or financial costs (as a percentage of assets), interacted with
profit status, in our main specification. Results are presented in Web Appendix
Table C.4. It turns out that we see little systematic relationship between costs
and contract choice, and the estimates are quite imprecise, so there is little to
say either for or against the proposition. Encouragingly, however, our main
results on lending by non-profits and for-profits are robust to including these
cost measures.
5.4. Competition measures
Next, Web Appendix Table C.5 examines robustness to separating our com-
petition measure into its three composite components. The first panel proxies
35While our model abstracts from loan size, for a given level of social capital S, growth in
loan sizes (perhaps driven by income growth) also predicts a shift toward IL. This is because
the larger the loan, the more social capital is required for a JL borrower to be willing to assist
her partner, making low social capital JL groups no longer viable. It is therefore encouraging
that our coefficient estimates are robust to inclusion of controls for GDP and loan size, because
this gives confidence that the trend we observe is not simply capturing by other changes in
lending behavior.
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competition with the number of bank branches per million inhabitants, the sec-
ond with the number of ATMs per million and the third with “financial depth,”
the share of loans given by domestic financial institutions relative to GDP. Each
variable is standardized to mean zero, standard deviation one. While a little
noisier, the results are broadly consistent with our earlier findings. In particular
we find consistent support for Propositions 2 and 3, but usually a zero effect of
competition on non-profits.
5.5. Regulatory changes
Next, we might be concerned that the patterns we observe are driven by
regulatory changes during our sample period which happen to correlate with
our proxy variables. We attempt to address such concerns in Web Appendix
Table C.6.
Panel A removes observations of MFIs whose legal status has changed during
the sample period. The results remain unchanged. In panel B, we control
flexibly for time-varying regulatory shocks, using Region by Legal Status by Year
fixed effects (legal status and for-profit status are correlated but not collinear).
Under the assumption that regulation varies according to legal status and not
profit status, this specification controls for time-varying regulatory shifts, albeit
only at the regional and not country level.
Finally, we check how sensitive our results are to individual countries, by
recomputing our main coefficients (α, η, and η+γ) for each competition measure
and dropping each country in turn. Web Appendix Figure C.3 provides box
plots of the coefficient estimates obtained in this exercise. While the results are
sensitive to some countries (which specific countries depends on the competition
measure), this only affects the sign of the estimated η + γ, which we already
saw tends to be close to zero.
5.6. Relaxing restrictions on the size of U
As discussed in section 3.6, relaxing the assumption that IL is always prof-
itable introduces a potential non-monotonicity: IL lending to low-S borrowers
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may shut down when borrowers’ outside options are very good, leading to non-
profits’ IL shares first increasing and then decreasing in U . This could lead us
to underestimate the responsiveness of IL lending by non-profits to changes in
U .
The driving force for the non-monotonicity in IL shares is the shutting down
of all IL lending when U is sufficiently high. Therefore we address the concern by
restricting attention to intensive margin changes in IL lending. Table C.7 does
this: in Panel A we drop all MFIs that ever report a portfolio that is either 0%
or 100% IL, while in Panel B we drop only individual MFI-years that meet this
criterion. The estimates become somewhat more noisy, but the basic pattern
is preserved in most cases. Interestingly and consistent with the prediction we
also find a more positive effect of competition on IL usage by non-profits than
in the main analysis.
6. Discussion
In this section we provide further discussion on the role of social capital in
the model, and an informal discussion of possible extensions for future work.
6.1. Social capital
A key variable in our model is “social capital”, which is used to sustain
mutual insurance under joint liability. In the model, social capital plays a useful
role by providing cutoff conditions at which lenders switch contract types, since
we can write conditions for joint liability to be offered in terms of the minimum
amount of social capital required (which differs by lender type). We then study
how these thresholds change with the lender type and borrowers’ outside option.
The fact that the for-profit requires higher social capital to offer JL reflects
that the space of parameters under which for-profits offer JL is smaller (in
other words, we could perform our analysis fixing S = 0, concluding that the
condition for for-profits to offer JL is “stricter” than for non-profits). Our
empirical analysis has assumed that social capital is either fixed or orthogonal
to changes in our commercialization proxy variables.
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Field evidence supports the notion that social capital supports repayment
of group loans. Feigenberg et al. (2013) find that increasing borrowing group
meeting frequency led to creation of social capital, which in turn led to in-
creases in mutual insurance among group members.36 Karlan (2007) exploits
quasi-random variation in group assignment and shows that socially connected
groups repay more often. Karlan (2005) finds that an experimental measure of
trustworthiness, as well as survey questions on trust, predict good repayment
behavior.
An alternative approach is to correlate proxies for social capital with lenders’
portfolio composition. We only observe such characteristics at the country level,
so the analysis is in essence a cross-country regression. Web Appendix C.8
presents some exploratory regressions, but we see little evidence that these are
systematically correlated with lending methodology.37
6.2. Further extensions
One feature not present in our model is cross-subsidization (see e.g. McIn-
tosh and Wydick (2005)). In the current framework we have assumed capital is
scarce, leading to rationing. A non-profit wishing to provide credit to a broader
user base might choose to offer a profitable IL contract to some borrowers (for
whom JL might also be feasible), so as to allow it to offer loss-making contracts
to other borrowers, thereby expanding the number of borrowers. Increased com-
petition decreases the profitability of IL relative to JL (this is the mechanism
that leads for-profits to switch contract types), so also reduces the benefit of
cross-subsidization. This will tend to push non-profits to use IL less as competi-
tion increases, dampening the relationship between competition and IL lending.
36Strikingly, this study was conducted with group lending but individual liability contracts.
However, the basic mechanism by which social capital sustains mutual insurance is the same
as in joint liability lending, see de Quidt et al. (2016).
37We regress individual liability shares on various proxies, plus year and region fixed effects.
We include the urban population share (as in table C.2), since social capital is plausibly higher
in rural areas, and four questions on trust from the World Values Survey. Ideally we would like
to observe the rural/urban composition of a given MFI’s borrowers, so as to explore whether
more rural MFIs within a given country are more likely to offer JL, but this information is
not available.
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Thus we may underestimate the effect of competition on non-profits’ IL shares.
Alternatively, if our proxy variables are associated with reduction in lenders’
cost of financing, cross-subsidization motives might be diminished as competi-
tion increases, reducing the incentive to use IL. This would similarly dampen
the relationship between the competition proxy and IL lending. The finding
that the main results change little when we include cost measures suggests this
is not a major concern.
Another possible extension would be to introduce within-group heterogeneity
and a richer space of possible outcomes. This could be important if some joint
liability borrowers are tempted to default on their own loans even when their
partner is repaying, leading to use of social sanctions in more states of the world,
and potentially blurring the boundary between individual and joint liability.
Alternatively, adverse selection (for example, a population of impatient bor-
rowers with high default risk) might induce lenders to use dynamic contracts
that screen out bad types, such as in Ghosh and Ray (2015). This, combined
with the higher repayment rates under joint liability, might change the static
trade-offs between contract types.
We conjecture, but leave to future work to prove, that the core mechanism
introduced in this paper would survive these extensions. Namely, it is the inter-
action between the different slopes of the incentive conditions under individual
and joint liability, with the different motivations of non-profit and for-profit,
that drives the differences in contract offerings between the two.
7. Conclusion
While it is often claimed that joint liability is in decline, there has been little
formal analysis beyond some allusions to JL being inconvenient for borrowers,
who dislike having their social capital leveraged in this way. For this taste-based
argument to have bite in explaining the trend, there must be a change in tastes
over time, which is very difficult to test (in particular because we are aware of
no dataset that even attempts to measure such preferences). In this paper we
show that even with stable tastes, commercialization can predict the decline.
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We provide a rigorous attempt to examine the trend empirically, and to
analyze its cause. We show that MFIs do indeed appear to be reducing the share
of joint liability in their portfolios. We argue theoretically that a key mechanism
underlying the decline of JL is commercialization: a hand-in-hand increase in
competition alongside a shift from non-profit to for-profit lending, and show
that both trends are present in the data. While the analysis does not perfectly
address endogeneity concerns, we test the model on a variety of sampling frames
and with a stringent set of fixed effects and controls. Overall, we find the data
are largely qualitatively consistent with the theory: non-profits do use joint
liability more than for-profits; competition is associated with increasing use of
joint liability by for-profits and with non-increasing or (in some specifications)
decreasing use of joint liability by non-profits.
As our data are imperfect and our competition measure is based on proxies
we avoid making strong quantitative claims based on our results. Also, in the
absence of a natural experiment, we do not have a way of cleanly causally
identifying the effect of changes in market structure on the switch from joint
liability to individual liability. We hope that in the future our analysis can be
complemented with more micro-level evidence on the mechanisms highlighted
in the paper.
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Figure 1: Stylized Facts. (a) plots the share of microfinance institutions that operate for profit.
(b) plots the average number of microfinance institutions per country. (c) plots the share of
lenders’ portfolios that are individual liability loans. (d) plots three proxies for microcredit
commercializations: the ratio of bank branches and ATMs to population, and the domestic
credit/GDP ratio.
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(a) Non-profit (b) For-profit
(c) Non-profit and for-profit
Figure 2: Contract regions. (a) plots the regions over which a non-profit lender offers JL or
IL. (b) plots the the regions over which a non-profit lender offers JL or IL. (c) combines (a)
and (b) in a single plot.
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Table 2: MFI Characteristics for MFIs reporting IL share by Number of Loans
Full Sample Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
Mean N Mean N p Mean N p
Portfolio at risk 90 days 6.28 1943 5.32 111 0.52 4.64 548 0.03
Loan Loss Rate 2.85 1819 1.48 111 0.07 2.78 548 0.94
Risk coverage 415.43 1704 879.61 111 0.50 336.89 548 0.60
Real Yield 23.80 1836 23.90 111 0.97 27.04 548 0.02
Nominal Yield 33.30 1837 31.62 111 0.49 34.78 548 0.33
Non-profit status 0.49 2176 0.67 111 0.01 0.60 548 <0.01
MIX Market Diamonds 2.60 2124 4.05 111 <0.01 3.31 548 <0.01
Operational Self Sufficiency 113.70 2004 112.26 111 0.62 114.65 548 0.72
Financial Expenses/ Assets 5.40 1860 5.48 111 0.90 5.42 548 0.95
Personnel Expenses/ Assets 10.87 1824 10.32 111 0.63 11.11 548 0.78
Admin Expenses/ Assets 9.54 1855 7.09 111 0.01 8.30 548 0.12
Profit margin 666.74 1999 7.48 111 0.75 7.74 548 0.75
Return on Assets -0.94 1886 2.01 111 <0.01 1.40 548 <0.01
Return on Equity 4.85 1881 1.63 111 0.71 7.05 548 0.76
Gross Loan Portfolio/ Assets 74.57 2088 79.46 111 0.05 77.64 548 0.13
Debt to Equity Ratio 7.06 2027 3.61 111 0.32 5.23 548 0.58
Cost per borrower 334.70 1660 243.21 111 0.09 280.82 548 0.28
Average Loan Balance per borrower 8131.41 2060 1428.31 111 0.08 1660.03 548 0.09
Share of female borrowers 62.05 1935 56.79 111 0.16 59.77 548 0.47
Number of Borrowers (in 1000s) 53.12 2066 44.23 111 0.61 68.52 548 0.31
Total Assets (in 1000 USD) 54642.83 2098 46780.25 111 0.55 78734.57 548 0.11
Gross Loan Portfolio (in 1000 USD) 48588.75 2164 37408.97 111 0.42 64207.89 548 0.32
Notes: Comparison of sample means across different samples used in the main table. Weakly balanced refers to MFIs
reporting lending method by number of loans at least twice from 2008 - 2014, while fully balanced only includes MFIs
that report data on lending method by number of loans in each year between 2008-2014. We report the 2009 values where
available (since 2009 has the greatest data availability), otherwise we take the closest available datapoint (averaging 2008
and 2010 when both are available). The number of MFIs changes as not all institutions report data on all the characteristics
explored. “Mean” reports the average of the characteristic, “N” reports the number of MFIs included in the sample, while
“p-value” reports the significance of the difference in means between the respective sample and the remainder of the full
sample.
Table 3: Country characteristics
Full Sample Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
Mean N Mean N p Mean N p
Urban population share 46.83 120 54.73 37 <0.01 49.46 81 0.05
Mobile Phones/100 people 65.30 121 81.73 37 <0.01 67.51 81 0.31
Agriculture share in GDP 17.98 115 13.60 37 <0.01 17.18 81 0.37
Industrial sector share in GDP 28.62 115 29.48 37 0.51 29.32 81 0.37
Service sector share in GDP 53.22 115 56.90 37 0.01 53.27 81 0.95
Development Aid per capita 82.93 115 82.04 37 0.95 79.33 81 0.60
GDP Growth Rate 4.14 121 4.29 37 0.70 4.13 81 0.96
GDP per capita 3627.77 121 3726.17 37 0.81 3361.64 81 0.31
Domestic Credit / GDP 43.52 120 45.10 37 0.70 39.84 81 0.14
Commercial bank density 12.59 121 18.68 37 <0.01 13.71 81 0.14
ATM Density 21.87 119 29.25 37 0.02 22.28 81 0.76
Notes: “Full sample” contains country-level characteristics for the countries represented in the full MIX
sample, while “weakly balanced” and “fully balanced” restrict to the countries that appear in the respective
panels (the “number of loans” samples). We report unweighted averages, i.e. each country is given equal
weight irrespective of the number or scale of MFIs in that country for 2009. The number of countries changes
as not all countries have data for all characteristics. “Mean” reports the average of the characteristic, “N”
reports the number of countries included in the sample, while “p-value” reports the significance of the
difference in means between the respective sample and the remainder of the full sample.
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Table 4: Non Profit Status, Competition and IL Lending
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition First PC -0.023 -0.079** -0.069*** -0.042 -0.066** -0.061***
(0.041) (0.030) (0.011) (0.036) (0.028) (0.016)
Non Profit -0.123* -0.116 -0.126** -0.175***
(0.068) (0.081) (0.050) (0.040)
Non Profit x Competition First PC 0.050 0.096* 0.076*** 0.036 0.084*** 0.065***
(0.052) (0.048) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.019)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .027 .016 .007 -.006 .018 .004
(.0515) (.0242) (.0205) (.0361) (.0177) (.0166)
MFIs 111 111 111 548 548 548
Countries 37 37 37 81 81 81
Observations 769 769 769 2573 2573 2573
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI as measured by Number of Loans.
Fully balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available for all years between 2008 and
2014, while weakly balanced includes only MFIs that report this information at least twice. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
52
Table 5: Wider sample covering 2008-2011: IL Share by number of loans and gross loan portfolio
Panel A: IL Share by Number of Loans
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition PCA -0.067* -0.077** -0.026 -0.064*** -0.044* -0.031*
(0.037) (0.030) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017)
Non Profit -0.174*** -0.230*** -0.124** -0.200***
(0.058) (0.072) (0.052) (0.047)
Non Profit x Competition PCA 0.058* 0.083** 0.020 0.050** 0.045** 0.027*
(0.029) (0.033) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.015)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.009 .007 -.006 -.015 .001 -.004
(.0237) (.0147) (.015) (.0181) (.0163) (.00905)
MFIs 366 366 366 874 874 874
Countries 61 61 61 87 87 87
Observations 1428 1422 1428 2705 2694 2705
Panel B : IL Share by Gross Loan Portfolio
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition PCA -0.100*** -0.072*** -0.023 -0.085*** -0.051** -0.029*
(0.026) (0.022) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.015)
Non Profit -0.182*** -0.220*** -0.145*** -0.201***
(0.045) (0.051) (0.043) (0.040)
Non Profit x Competition PCA 0.072*** 0.096*** 0.032* 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.026*
(0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.028 .024* .009 -.027* .008 -.002
(.0177) (.0138) (.0175) (.0153) (.0155) (.0125)
MFIs 359 359 359 828 828 828
Countries 58 58 58 86 86 86
Observations 1399 1393 1399 2552 2542 2552
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI as measured by Number of Loans (Panel
A) or by Value of Loan Portfolio (Panel B). Fully balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available
for all years from 2008-2011, while weakly balanced includes only MFIs that report this information at least twice. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Appendix A. Data Appendix
We combine three different data sets from the MIX Market and data from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. This note will outline the
process by which we combine these different data sources to arrive at the data
set we use in our paper.
Global Data Download. The MIX, in the past, provided a global data download
of basic portfolio information. Unfortunately, access to the MIX market data
has become more restrictive requiring an account and even paid subscriptions
for some reports. We rely on the last snapshot of the global data download
that is available via the WayBackMachine on https://web.archive.org/web/
20150215000000*/http://www.mixmarket.org/crossmarket-analysis-report/
download.
The global data download contains basic profile information, such as the
MFI name, the respective MIX Market identification number, Profit status,
Legal status as well as the basic portfolio report, detailing the Number of Loans
Outstanding, Portfolio At Risk and other measures of performance that vary at
the MFI level over time. We drop MFIs for which the Profit Status information
is missing. We match the various financial years to the nearest calendar years.
Unfortunately this comprehensive data download does not provide a detailed
breakdown of lending methodology.
Further, we map the country names into 16 world regions: Central Africa,
Central America, Central Asia, East Asia, Eastern Africa, Indian Ocean, North-
ern Africa, Northern Asia, South America, South Asia, South East Asia, South
East Europe, South West Asia, Southern Africa, West Indies, Western Africa.
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This region definition is finer than the one used by the MIX market, which only
distinguishes continent.
This is our basic MFI-level panel, which we augment with auxiliary data
obtained from detailed portfolio reports to obtain information about lending
methodology.
Detailed Portfolio Reports. Information on the lending methodology was col-
lected manually by Ahlin and Suandi (2018), who kindly shared this data with
us. They follow in their sampling broadly the same approach as used in Ahlin
et al. (2011). The data set is selected to meet a range of criteria:
• Since MIX did not report information on lending methodology before 2008,
the dataset only covers the period from 2008-2014. This discards around
40% of the observations which came from prior to 2008, with the earliest
data stemming from 1996.
• Only MFIs who report data by calendar-year are included, which lines
up with the World Development Indicator variables we use, which are
reported by calendar year. The vast majority (82%) of MFI-year observa-
tions are reported at the calendar year.
• Using the filters provided by the MIX Market website, the set of MFIs is
restricted to MFIs that are classified as having four or five “diamonds”
(in the year the download took place - late 2015).
• Lastly, MFIs reporting more than 20 percent of their current operations
as non-microfinance related are excluded.
The selectness of our sample relative to the population of MFIs that report
data to the MIX is explored in Table 2.
Incorporation Date and Profit Status. In order to construct the top left panel
of Figure 1, we obtain data on the incorporation dates of the MFIs. Unfor-
tunately, this information is not contained in the main data download. We
make use of an older data download which provides this information for the
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set of MFIs that reported some data to the MIX market prior to February
2011. This data is not available on the main website anymore, but can be re-
trieved from https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.mixmarket.org/
sites/default/files/mfi_profile_information_02.24.11.xls. We merge
the date established to the global data download to construct the share of for-
profit MFIs by incorporation dates. Obviously, this can only be constructed for
the set of MFIs for which we know the incorporation date, in order to illustrate
the global trend the figure also includes MFIs that do not disclose data on lend-
ing methodology. The figure looks very similar when weighting by MFI size in
2009 or by including e.g. only on the MFIs from the weakly balanced sample.
In addition, the 2011 data snapshot provides us with an additional record
of the For-profit/non-profit status (“profit status”) as of February 2011. One
concern might be that some MFIs changed status prior to February 2011 (or
between February 2011 and the end of 2011). Since legal status and non profit
status are likely closely related (see Appendix Table C.1), we remove MFIs that
switched legal status during our sample period. The results are presented in
Table C.6.
Competition Proxies. Lastly, we obtain proxy variables for the extent of compe-
tition from the development indicators. These can be obtained from the World
Bank Website, available at http://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
We use these data as proxies for the borrowers’ outside options, the avail-
ability of alternative sources of credit. Figure 1 plots the cross-country averages
over time including the set of countries that are included in our weakly balanced
panel frame (which includes some country-year observations in which individual
indicators are missing) in these measures for the set of countries that appear in
the full MIX dataset. Again, the trends look similar when focusing only on the
countries which are present in our weakly balanced sample.
In order to combine the information contained in the three proxy variables,
we construct their first principal component. The goal of principal component
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analysis is to produce a low-dimensional representation of a dataset by finding a
set of orthogonal linear combinations of the (standardized) variables that have
maximal variance. The first principal component is a variable Z that is a linear
combination of our three proxy variables X1, X2, X3:
Z = φ1X1 + φ2X2 + φ3X3
fixing
∑
i φ
2
i = 1, such that V ar(Z) is maximized. The second principal com-
ponent is constructed to maximize variance subject to being orthogonal to Z,
etc.
The φs for the each principal component are given by the corresponding
eigenvector of the correlation matrix of the standardized proxy variables. The
matrix of eigenvectors is provided in Table A.1. The associated eigenvalues give
the variance of the principal components, and since the principal components
are orthogonal from these one can compute the fraction of the variance of the
proxies explained by each principal component. The first principal component
in our case accounts for 52.5% of the variation in the three proxies.
Table A.1: Matrix of Eigenvectors
e(L)
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3
Commercial bank density .5425762 .7177629 .43638
ATM Density .6361516 -.0118496 -.7714731
Domestic Credit / GDP .5485638 -.6961867 .4630353
We can also compute the loadings of the first principal component, which are
the correlations between the original variables and the first principal component.
These are informative of the extent to which each variable contributes to the
first principal component. The factor loadings are given in Table A.2.
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Table A.2: Factor Loadings
(1)
r1
Competition First PC 1
Commercial bank density .6807061
ATM Density .7981041
Domestic Credit / GDP .6882182
World Values Survey. We downloaded the most recent release of the World Val-
ues Survey (WVS) Longitudinal dataset, available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.
org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp, which combines survey data across all the six
waves to construct cross-sectional proxy variables for social capital across a
broad set of countries. We focused on the trust measures as these are most
widely included across the different survey waves allowing broad coverage. We
compute four measures summarizing the average respondent’s response to four
trust-related questions. First, we compute the share of respondents who agree
with the statement that “Most people can be trusted.” The three other ques-
tions that have less coverage across survey waves ask respondents whether re-
spondents trust “People you know personally,” “People you have just met,”
or “Members of your family.” For these questions, the responses are provided
on a four point Likert scale. We compute the share pertaining to the number
of respondents who either state that they “Trust completely” or “Trust some-
what”, as opposed to stating “Do not trust very much” or “Do not trust at all.”
The correlation patterns we document here do not become stronger if we only
compute the share of respondents who “Trust completely.”
5
Appendix B. Theory Appendix
Appendix B.1. Derivation of steady-state IL/JL shares
The non-profit IL share in period t is as follows:
ηˆt = ηˆt−1p+ ηˆt−1(1− p)F (Sˆ(U)) + (1− ηˆt−1)(1− q)F (Sˆ(U))
The first term on the right-hand side corresponds to the non-defaulting IL bor-
rowers (fraction p of the ηˆt−1 IL borrowers), who retain their IL contracts. The
second term corresponds to the vacancies at formerly IL branches which are
filled by new IL borrowers (fraction 1− p of the ηˆt−1 borrowers default creating
vacancies, and then new borrowers are drawn of whom fraction F (Sˆ) receive IL
and 1 − F (Sˆ) receive JL). The third term corresponds to the vacancies at for-
merly JL branches which are now filled by IL borrowers (fraction 1−q = (1−p)2
JL borrowers default creating vacancies, and then new borrowers are drawn of
whom fraction F (Sˆ) receive IL and 1− F (Sˆ) receive JL).
Solving this equation for the steady state by setting ηˆt = ηˆt−1 we obtain:
ηˆ(U) =
F (Sˆ(U))(1− p)
1− F (Sˆ(U))p
The steady state JL share is equal to 1 − ηˆ(U). The for-profit derivations are
identical.
Appendix B.2. Endogenizing U
We take the simplest case, where social capital is homogeneous and equal
to S for all borrowers. Since social capital is assumed to be observable one
could model the market with heterogeneous S as being segmented into sepa-
rate markets corresponding to each possible value of S, by repeating the below
analysis.
The population of borrowers has measure 2, but it is simpler to work in
terms of the measure of pairs of borrowers, which has measure 1. The measure
of lenders is l < 1 (recall that each lender can serve two borrowers, and that
if l > 1 then all borrowers can guarantee they receive a loan every period, so
have no incentive to repay their current loan). Since there is excess demand for
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credit, l borrower pairs are served each period. Thus there are lf for-profits and
l(1− f) non-profits.
Each period some borrowers default, leaving vacancies at their branches. We
allow for the possibility that some lenders offer IL and some offer JL, and since
borrowers are homogeneous we assume that their probability of receiving a given
contract equals their probability of matching to a lender offering that contract.
Thus, because of defaults, lf η˜(U)(1− p) for-profit IL vacancies, lf(1− η˜)(1− q)
for-profit JL vacancies, l(1 − f)ηˆ(U)(1 − p) non-profit IL vacancies and l(1 −
f)(1 − ηˆ)(1 − q) non-profit JL vacancies open each period. The total measure
of unmatched borrowers, which we define as D(U), is the number of defaulters
last period plus the excess demand, 1− l, equalling:
D(U) = 1− l + l[fη˜(U)(1− p) + (1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)
+ f(1− η˜(U))(1− q) + (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)].
(B.1)
Hence, an unmatched borrower can expect to receive:
U =
1
D(U)
[lf η˜(U)(1− p)V˜ IL(U, S) + l(1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)Vˆ IL(U)
+ lf(1− η˜(U))(1− q)V˜ JL(U) + l(1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)Vˆ JL(U)
+ (1− l)δU ].
(B.2)
An equilibrium obtains at a fixed point whereby lenders do not want to
change their contract offerings given the value of U . We do not proceed with
an in-depth analysis, but we note that there at least exist all-IL (η˜ = ηˆ = 1)
and all-JL (η˜ = ηˆ = 0) equilibria. This follows from the analysis of competitive
equilibrium in de Quidt et al. (in press), where we derive as a function of S the
value of l such that all lenders earn zero profits. Except for a unique value for S
(at which both contracts break even) the equilibrium involves either all lenders
offering IL (when S is low) or all lenders offering JL (when S is high). Since we
have not assumed competitive equilibrium here there will also be cases where
non-profits offer only JL and for-profits offer only IL, when S ∈ (Sˆ(U), S˜(U)].
There will also be cases where one or potentially both lender types offer some
IL and some JL.
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While a complete analysis is beyond the scope of this exercise, we show one
result, that U is increasing in l, as would naturally be expected. Intuitively, the
more lenders are present in the market. We show this holding the ηs constant,
i.e. assuming the composition of loan contracts remains unchained (which holds
when S 6= Sˆ(U) and S 6= S˜(U)).
First, a little rearranging yields:
UD(U) = Ul[fη˜(U)(1− p) + (1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)
+ f(1− η˜(U))(1− q) + (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)] + (1− l)δU
+ l[fη˜(U)(1− p)(V˜ IL(U, S)− U)
+ (1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)(Vˆ IL(U)− U)
+ f(1− η˜(U))(1− q)(V˜ JL(U)− U)
+ (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)(Vˆ JL(U)− U)].
Rearranging some more, using the expression for D(U), and substituting for the
V s:
U(1− l)(1− δ) = l[fη˜(U)(1− p)(V˜ IL(U, S)− U)
+ (1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)(Vˆ IL(U)− U)
+ f(1− η˜(U))(1− q)(V˜ JL(U)− U)
+ (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)(Vˆ JL(U)− U)]
= l
[
fη˜(U)(1− p)
(
pR− pr˜IL(U)
1− δp −
(1− δ)U
1− δp
)
+ (1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)
(
pR− ρ
1− δp −
(1− δ)U
1− δp
)
+ f(1− η˜(U))(1− q)
(
pR− qr˜JL(U, S)
1− δq −
(1− δ)U
1− δq
)
+ (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)
(
pR− ρ
1− δq −
(1− δ)U
1− δq
)]
where the last line uses the definitions of V IL and V JL. If we assume that
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S ≤ S¯(U), so that r˜JL(U, S) = rIC2(U, S), then we have:
U(1− l)(1− δ) = l [fη˜(U)(1− p) (pR− (1− δ)U)
+ (1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)
(
pR− ρ
1− δp −
(1− δ)U
1− δp
)
+ f(1− η˜(U))(1− q)
(
2
2− δq (pR− (1− δ)U)−
δq
2− δqS
)
+ (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)
(
pR− ρ
1− δq −
(1− δ)U
1− δq
)]
so
U(1− δ)
[
(1− l) + l
(
fη˜(U)(1− p) + f(1− η˜(U))2(1− q)
2− δq
+ (1− f)ηˆ(U) 1− p
1− δp + (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))
1− q
1− δq
)]
= l [fη˜(U)(1− p)pR
+ (1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)
(
pR− ρ
1− δp
)
+ f(1− η˜(U))(1− q)
(
2
2− δq pR−
δq
2− δqS
)
+ (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)
(
pR− ρ
1− δq
)]
and therefore:
U =
A
B
A = l [fη˜(U)(1− p)pR
+ (1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)
(
pR− ρ
1− δp
)
+ f(1− η˜(U))(1− q)
(
2
2− δq pR−
δq
2− δqS
)
+ (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)
(
pR− ρ
1− δq
)]
> 0
B = (1− δ)
[
(1− l) + l
(
fη˜(U)(1− p) + f(1− η˜(U))2(1− q)
2− δq
+ (1− f)ηˆ(U) 1− p
1− δp + (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))
1− q
1− δq
)]
> 0
where the first inequality relies on S ≤ S¯(U) which implies
2pR− δqS ≥ (2− δq)pR+ δq(1− δ)U > 0
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Then, holding ηˆ and η˜ constant:
∂U
∂l
=
1
B2
(
B
∂A
∂l
−A∂B
∂l
)
It is obvious that ∂A∂l > 0 since A is positive and proportional to l. And:
∂B
∂l
= (1− δ)
(
fη˜(U)(1− p) + f(1− η˜(U))2(1− q)
2− δq
+ (1− f)ηˆ(U) 1− p
1− δp + (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))
1− q
1− δq − 1
)
< 0
so ∂U∂l > 0.
If instead we assume S > S¯(U) then
U(1− l)(1− δ) = l [fη˜(U)(1− p) (pR− (1− δ)U)
+ (1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)
(
pR− ρ
1− δp −
(1− δ)U
1− δp
)
+ f(1− η˜(U))(1− q) (pR− (1− δ)U)
+ (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)
(
pR− ρ
1− δq −
(1− δ)U
1− δq
)]
The remaining steps go through much as before.
10
Appendix C. Additional figures and tables
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Figure C.1: Values of p and δ consistent with Assumptions 1 and 3.
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(a) Benchmark
(b) High ρ (c) Low R
(d) Low δ (e) Low p
Figure C.2: Contract regions for varying parameters
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Table C.1: Non Profit Status and Legal Status
For-Profit Non-Profit Total
Legal Status
Bank 199 4 203
Credit Union / Cooperative 89 358 447
NBFI 569 106 675
NGO 44 590 634
Other 31 10 41
Rural Bank 108 2 110
Total 1,040 1,070 2,110
Notes: MFIs by legal status of MFIs that ever reported to the MIX Market.
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Table C.2: Additional country-level controls, IL shares by number of loans
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition First PC -0.056** -0.062*** -0.068*** -0.018 -0.039 -0.056***
(0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.041) (0.024) (0.018)
Non Profit -0.129 -0.139** -0.134*** -0.156***
(0.083) (0.057) (0.038) (0.035)
Non Profit x Competition First PC 0.021 0.075** 0.092*** -0.004 0.056 0.071**
(0.057) (0.028) (0.030) (0.045) (0.038) (0.027)
Further Interactions:
Urban population share -0.005 -0.014 -0.014* -0.002 -0.017* -0.014
(0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.010) (0.011)
Non Profit x Urban population share -0.001 0.011** -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) (0.020)
Mobile Phones/100 people -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Non Profit x Mobile Phones/100 people -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004*** -0.002** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industrial sector share in GDP -0.002 -0.011 -0.015** -0.002 -0.009** -0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Non Profit x Industrial sector share in GDP -0.015 -0.023** -0.025 -0.010 -0.004 -0.013*
(0.017) (0.010) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Service sector share in GDP 0.001 -0.006 -0.012** 0.002 -0.011** -0.009*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Non Profit x Service sector share in GDP -0.013 0.003 -0.014 -0.010* -0.006 -0.009
(0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Development Aid as share of GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Non Profit x Development Aid as share of GDP -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP per capita 0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Non Profit x GDP per capita 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.035 .013 .024 -.022 .017 .016
(.0568) (.0226) (.0241) (.0505) (.0257) (.0212)
MFIs 108 108 108 521 521 521
Countries 35 35 35 75 75 75
Observations 744 744 744 2406 2406 2406
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI. Fully balanced refers to a balanced dataset
for which lending methodology data is available for the period 2008-2014, while weakly balanced includes only MFIs that report this
information at least twice. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table C.3: Additional fixed effects and MFI-level controls
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Non Profit -0.117 -0.124* -0.175*** -0.145***
(0.081) (0.071) (0.039) (0.032)
Non Profit x Competition First PC 0.101* 0.087*** 0.072 0.084** 0.092*** 0.078*** 0.073*** 0.070**
(0.054) (0.027) (0.043) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028)
MFIs 98 98 98 98 527 520 525 503
Countries 24 24 24 24 61 59 60 56
Observations 678 678 669 669 2429 2421 2326 2301
MFI FE X X X X
Country x Year FE X X X X X X X X
MFI Controls X X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI as measured by Number of Loans. Fully balanced
refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available for the period 2008-2014, while weakly balanced includes only
MFIs that report this information at least twice. Controls include Diamonds, Capital to Asset Ratio, Debt to equity ratio, Average loan
balance per borrower, Return on assets, Financial revenue/Assets, Yield on gross portfolio (nominal), Financial expense/assets, Operating
expense/assets. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table C.4: Cost regressions
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
Panel A: Operating expense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition First PC -0.002 -0.065** -0.067*** -0.030 -0.070** -0.061***
(0.041) (0.032) (0.012) (0.032) (0.028) (0.015)
Non Profit -0.134* -0.121 -0.133*** -0.164***
(0.073) (0.081) (0.042) (0.036)
Non Profit × Competition First PC 0.032 0.083 0.077*** 0.027 0.078*** 0.067***
(0.051) (0.049) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.019)
Operating expense (% of assets) -0.093 -0.188** -0.016 -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.019
(0.083) (0.080) (0.024) (0.030) (0.021) (0.015)
Non Profit × Operating expense (% of assets) -0.066 0.052 0.013 -0.022 -0.015 0.013
(0.102) (0.088) (0.026) (0.036) (0.030) (0.018)
Countries 37 37 37 81 81 81
MFIs 111 111 111 548 548 548
Observations 761 761 761 2479 2479 2479
Panel B : Financial expense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition First PC -0.021 -0.071** -0.068*** -0.039 -0.067** -0.061***
(0.042) (0.027) (0.011) (0.035) (0.026) (0.015)
Non Profit -0.110 -0.091 -0.127** -0.179***
(0.074) (0.077) (0.053) (0.042)
Non Profit × Competition First PC 0.050 0.088** 0.078*** 0.034 0.085*** 0.066***
(0.055) (0.041) (0.022) (0.029) (0.026) (0.018)
Financial expense (% of assets) 0.037 0.056 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.043) (0.050) (0.008) (0.020) (0.022) (0.011)
Non Profit × Financial expense (% of assets) -0.011 -0.131* -0.008 0.013 0.015 0.002
(0.056) (0.065) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.019)
Countries 37 37 37 81 81 81
MFIs 111 111 111 548 548 548
Observations 759 759 759 2472 2472 2472
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI as measured by Number of Loans.
Strongly balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available for all years between 2008 and
2014, while weakly balanced includes only MFIs that report this information at least twice. The costs measures are the Operating
expenses in a financial year as a share of the value of assets at the end of a year in panel A, while they focus on the cost of financing
as a share of the value of assets in Panel B. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table C.5: IL Share by Number of Loans: Robustness to Other Competition Proxy Variables
Panel A: Bank Branch Density
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density 0.024 -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.002 -0.084*** -0.064***
(0.050) (0.030) (0.007) (0.037) (0.030) (0.008)
Non Profit -0.036 -0.041 -0.051 -0.070
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.108* 0.094* 0.095*** 0.099** 0.140** 0.078***
(0.054) (0.047) (0.016) (0.047) (0.054) (0.015)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .132* .01 .011 .097*** .056** .014
(.0689) (.0236) (.0195) (.0358) (.0265) (.0197)
MFIs 111 111 111 548 548 548
Countries 37 37 37 81 81 81
Observations 769 769 769 2591 2591 2591
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
3
Panel B : ATM Density
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ATM Density -0.007 -0.182 -0.392*** -0.224* -0.259*** -0.155
(0.131) (0.231) (0.123) (0.123) (0.073) (0.109)
Non Profit -0.038 0.001 0.057 0.128
(0.196) (0.238) (0.141) (0.089)
Non-Profit x ATM Density 0.063 0.080 0.332* 0.161 0.267*** 0.143
(0.188) (0.233) (0.172) (0.097) (0.074) (0.107)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .057 -.102* -.059 -.063 .008 -.012
(.168) (.0556) (.0879) (.106) (.0427) (.0361)
MFIs 111 111 111 548 548 548
Countries 37 37 37 81 81 81
Observations 771 771 771 2583 2583 2583
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Panel C : Domestic Credit Share
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic Credit / GDP -0.344* -0.173 -0.009 -0.006 -0.064 -0.156*
(0.171) (0.131) (0.147) (0.083) (0.159) (0.087)
Non Profit 0.176 0.906*** -0.237 -0.170
(0.303) (0.320) (0.155) (0.222)
Non-Profit x Domestic Credit Share 0.195 0.634*** 0.243 -0.069 0.003 0.251*
(0.184) (0.205) (0.284) (0.087) (0.132) (0.131)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.149 .461** .234 -.074 -.061 .095
(.129) (.188) (.209) (.0683) (.163) (.127)
MFIs 111 111 111 548 548 548
Countries 37 37 37 81 81 81
Observations 777 777 777 2608 2608 2608
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI as measured by Number of Loans.
Strongly balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available for at all years between 2008
and 2014, while weakly balanced includes only MFIs that report this information at least twice. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table C.6: Controlling for Regulatory changes: Removing MFIs that switched Legal Status and controlling flexibly for status: Non
Profit Status, Competition and IL Lending
Panel A: Removing Legal Status changes
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition First PC 0.001 -0.058 -0.060*** -0.037 -0.064* -0.065***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.013) (0.040) (0.032) (0.016)
Non Profit -0.132 -0.109 -0.138** -0.205***
(0.113) (0.163) (0.055) (0.048)
Non Profit x Competition First PC 0.095 0.067 0.072*** 0.037 0.086*** 0.073***
(0.073) (0.082) (0.014) (0.031) (0.033) (0.020)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .095* .009 .011 0 .022 .008
(.0554) (.0376) (.0208) (.0402) (.0184) (.0174)
MFIs 71 71 71 422 422 422
Countries 25 25 25 79 79 79
Observations 496 496 496 1919 1919 1919
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Panel B : Region specific legal status FE
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition First PC -0.028 -0.083* -0.060* -0.025 -0.056* -0.062***
(0.057) (0.046) (0.033) (0.041) (0.028) (0.020)
Non Profit -0.138 -0.088 -0.120** -0.096
(0.089) (0.120) (0.058) (0.060)
Non Profit x Competition First PC 0.081 0.121 0.081 0.035 0.074* 0.085**
(0.064) (0.078) (0.058) (0.029) (0.038) (0.041)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .053 .038 .022 .01 .018 .022
(.0548) (.0368) (.0315) (.0334) (.018) (.0256)
MFIs 111 111 111 548 548 548
Countries 37 37 37 81 81 81
Observations 769 769 769 2573 2573 2573
Region x Legal Status x Year FE X X X X X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI as measured by Number of Loans.
Strongly balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available for each year between 2008 and
2014, while weakly balanced includes only MFIs that report this information at least twice. We drop MFIs whose legal status has
changed. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table C.7: Dropping MFIs that report to have 100% of their portfolio as IL or JL loans: Non Profit Status, Competition and IL Lending
Panel A: Drop MFI that ever report 100% JL/IL
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition First PC -0.229*** -0.115 0.062 -0.180*** -0.025 -0.021
(0.071) (0.118) (0.132) (0.038) (0.048) (0.053)
Non Profit 0.033 0.055 -0.035 -0.112*
(0.084) (0.097) (0.061) (0.058)
Non Profit x Competition First PC 0.195* 0.172 -0.006 0.123** 0.101** 0.094
(0.098) (0.104) (0.130) (0.052) (0.042) (0.058)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.035 .057 .056 -.056 .076* .074*
(.0741) (.0458) (.043) (.0383) (.0442) (.0394)
MFIs 47 47 47 215 215 215
Countries 20 20 20 56 56 56
Observations 322 322 322 1019 1019 1019
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Panel B : Drop MFI years that report 100% JL/IL
Fully Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition First PC -0.070 -0.037 0.010 -0.111** 0.002 -0.015
(0.081) (0.051) (0.032) (0.055) (0.038) (0.028)
Non Profit -0.173* -0.064 -0.143** -0.192***
(0.089) (0.090) (0.061) (0.046)
Non Profit x Competition First PC 0.029 0.089 0.054 0.047 0.053 0.084**
(0.076) (0.075) (0.038) (0.044) (0.037) (0.037)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.04 .052 .064 -.063** .054* .07**
(.0632) (.0406) (.0437) (.0317) (.0313) (.0335)
MFIs 83 83 83 392 392 392
Countries 32 32 32 74 74 74
Observations 432 432 432 1454 1454 1454
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI as measured by Number of Loans. Panel A
removes MFIs that at any point in time report to only have IL or JL loans , while Panel B only removes the respective years in which this
is the case. Strongly balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available for each year between 2008 and
2014, while weakly balanced includes only MFIs that report this information at least twice. We drop MFIs whose legal status has changed.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table C.8: Correlation between IL share and proxies for social capital on identical samples
Panel A Weakly balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Urban population share -0.002
(0.003)
Most people can be trusted 0.109
(0.173)
Trust people just met 2.368
(2.162)
Trust family members 0.659
(0.472)
Trust people you know 0.377
(0.364)
Countries 80 49 37 37 37
MFIs 541 379 324 324 324
Observations 2535 1766 1483 1483 1483
Region FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Panel B Fully balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Urban population share 0.002
(0.004)
Most people can be trusted 0.765**
(0.339)
Trust people just met -2.997
(10.844)
Trust family members 0.074
(0.965)
Trust people you know -0.300
(0.844)
Countries 36 26 18 18 18
MFIs 109 67 51 51 51
Observations 755 467 357 357 357
Region FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of IL lending. The first trust measure measures
the share of respondents that reported that “Most people can be trusted” across all World
Values Surveys conducted. Urban population share measures the share of a countries
population that lives in urban areas.
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